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PART III SUBSTANTIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
CHAPTER 9 TORTURE 
 
C H A P T E R 9 
 
Torture 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The prohibition against torture is one of the most widely codified proscriptions under 
international law. Torture is the subject of its own multilateral treaty—the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (―Torture 
Convention‖). Prohibitions against torture can be found in every omnibus international human 
rights and humanitarian law treaty, as well as in each of the three regional human rights 
conventions, and is an enumerated war crime and crime against humanity. The prohibition 
against torture is now accepted as a jus cogens norm of international human rights law. It has 
been so recognized by both international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia; by all three regional human rights regimes; by the Committee Against Torture 
(established to monitor compliance with the Torture Convention); by judges in numerous 
domestic jurisdictions; by authoritative statements of international law, including the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States; and by the Universal Islamic 
Declaration of Human Rights. The prohibition against torture is an absolute one; torture is 
prohibited in all circumstances, even in cases of war or national emergency. Not only are states 
prohibited from committing torture, they are also forbidden to extradite or otherwise send an 
individual to a place where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person will be 
tortured (the rule of non-refoulement). Almost every codified prohibition of torture is 
accompanied by a bar on other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(CIDT), although such acts are not criminalized as extensively as torture. 
 No government today officially condones the use of torture. And yet, acts that violate the 
Torture Convention and related prohibitions have been recorded in almost all states of the world. 
See Atlas of Torture, http://www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/countrymap.  Notwithstanding universal 
acceptance of the definition of torture under international law (quoted below), strong 
disagreements persist with respect to whether certain specific practices meet the definition, 
enabling states to claim that their police, detention practices, interrogation techniques, or systems 
of punishment do not run afoul of these prohibitions. The potential for equivocation around the 
scope of the prohibition against torture has taken on new urgency in light of the revelation that 
the United States government during the presidency of George W. Bush sanctioned the 
development and use of so called ―enhanced interrogation techniques‖ in the ―war on terror‖ that 
many observers consider to be torture and/or CIDT. Critics contend that the United States 
justified the use of coercive techniques by exploiting the apparent ―gap‖ between torture and 
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CIDT in international law. Critics also charge that the United States‘ use of these techniques has 
undermined the torture prohibition and given ―cover‖ for other states to adopt similar techniques 
against their own war-time detainees, criminal suspects, prisoners, and others who find 
themselves in the custody of state agents. The events of September 11, 2001—and the 
subsequent detention of suspected terrorists in Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere—
prompted a public debate in the United States concerning the morality, legality and utility of 
torture. This Chapter engages these issues with reference to caselaw emerging from the 
international criminal tribunals and domestic courts as well as memoranda generated by 
departments of the U.S. government and international reactions thereto.  
Before engaging with the current debates on torture, we start with some historical context.  
The universal condemnation of torture is a relatively modern development. Not only was torture 
not always prohibited, at times throughout history it was viewed as a crucial element of a justice 
system. 
 
John Langbein, The Legal History of Torture, in Torture: A Collection, at 93 (Sanford 
Levinson, ed., 2004) 
 
 European law of proof emerged in the city-states of northern Italy in the thirteenth 
century. It spread across the Continent together with the rest of Roman-canon criminal and civil 
procedure as part of the broader movement known as the reception of Roman law. Investigation 
under torture was reserved for cases of serious crime, for which the sanction was death or 
maiming. * * * 
 The largest chapter of the European law of torture concerned the prerequisites for 
examination under torture. European jurists devised what modern American lawyers would call a 
standard of probable cause, designed to ensure that only persons highly likely to be guilty would 
be examined under torture. Torture was permitted only when a so-called half proof had been 
established against the suspects. That meant either one eyewitness, or circumstantial evidence 
that satisfied elaborate requirements of gravity. In the example in which a suspect was caught 
with the dagger and the loot, each of those indicia would have been reckoned as a quarter proof, 
which, cumulated to a half proof, would have been sufficient to permit the authorities to examine 
the suspect under torture. * * * 
 Alas, because torture tests endurance rather than veracity, innocent persons might (as one 
sixteenth-century handbook on criminal procedure warned) yield to "the pain and torment and 
confess things that they never did." For a variety of reasons, the safeguards never proved 
adequate. If the examining magistrate engaged in suggestive questioning, even accidentally, his 
lapse could not always be detected or prevented. If the accused knew something about the crime 
but was still innocent, what he did know might be enough to give his confession verisimilitude. 
In some jurisdictions the requirement of verification was not enforced or was enforced 
indifferently. 
 In order to achieve a verbal or technical reconciliation with the requirement of the formal 
law of proof that the confession be voluntary, the law treated a confession extracted under torture 
as involuntary, hence ineffective, unless the accused repeated it free from torture at a hearing 
held a day or so later. Sometimes the accused who had confessed under torture did recant when 
asked to confirm his confession. But seldom to avail: The examination under torture could 
thereupon be repeated. When an accused confessed under torture, recanted, and was then tortured 
anew, he learned quickly enough that only a "voluntary" confession at the ratification hearing 
would save him from further agony in the torture chamber. Thus, Johannes Julius, the 
seventeenth-century burgomaster of Bamburg, Germany, writing from his dungeon cell where he 
was awaiting execution, told his daughter why he had confessed to witchcraft "for which I must 
die. It is all falsehood and invention, so help me God. . . . They never cease to torture until one 
says something." Against the coercive force of the engines of torture, no safeguards were ever 
found that could protect the innocent and guarantee the truth. The agony of torture created an 
incentive to speak, but not necessarily to speak the truth. 
 These shortcomings in the law of torture were identified even in the Middle Ages and 
were the subject of emphatic complaint in Renaissance and early modern times. Cases arose 
recurrently in which the real culprit was detected after an innocent accused had confessed under 
torture and been convicted and executed. In the eighteenth century, as the law of torture was 
finally about to be abolished, along with the system of proof that had required it, Beccaria [an 
Italian philosopher and the author of On Crimes and Punishments (1764)] and Voltaire [a French 
enlightenment thinker] became famous as critics of judicial torture by pointing to such cases, but 
they were latecomers to a critical legal literature nearly as old as the law of torture itself. Judicial 
torture survived the centuries not because its defects had been concealed but in spite of their 
having been long revealed. * * * 
 The European states abolished the system of judicial torture within about two generations. 
Frederick the Great all but abolished torture within a month of his accession to the Prussian 
throne in 1740; torture was used for the last time in Prussia in 1752 and was definitely abolished 
in 1754. In 1770, Saxony and Denmark abolished torture; in 1776, Poland and Austria–Bohemia; 
in 1780, France; in 1786, Tuscany; in 1787, the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium); and in 1789, 
Sicily. Early in the nineteenth century, abolition reached the last corners of the Continent. 
 
II. Defining Torture in Human Rights Law: Intent, Severity, Purpose, and State Action 
 
 Article 1(1) of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment sets forth a definition of torture: 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
The Convention further provides that  
 
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture 
as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10 [duty to train law enforcement, 
military, etc. personnel], 11 [duty to review interrogation practices], 12 [duty to ensure 
prompt and impartial investigation] and 13 [right to complain] shall apply with the 
substitution for references to torture or references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
Article 1 is qualified by the statement that it is ―without prejudice to any international instrument 
or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application.‖  
 There are four elements to proving the crime of torture under the Convention definition: 
1) severe pain or suffering 2) intentionally inflicted 3) for one of the enumerated purposes 4) by 
someone acting on behalf of a state. CIDT is not separately defined. The Torture Convention 
definition may be contrasted with that of the 1987 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture, which defines torture at Article 2 as:  
 
For the purposes of this Convention, torture shall be understood to be any act 
intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a 
person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal 
punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture shall 
also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the 
personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do 
not cause physical pain or mental anguish. 
 
Article 3 indicates that the treaty applies to public servants or employees as well as those who act 
at the instigation of a public servant or employee. About half of the eligible states are members; 
the United States is not a party. 
As you review the materials in this Chapter, consider the way in which these definitions 
of torture, which have their origins in human rights treaties, have been adapted and applied in 
international criminal law. Pay particular attention to which elements of the above definitions 
have been retained and which have been abandoned and why. In addition, endeavor to formulate 
a definition of CIDT and consider when such conduct should give rise to criminal penalties under 
international or domestic law.  
 
III. Defining Torture in International Criminal Law 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) compared the 
elements of the crime of torture in human rights law and international criminal law in a case 
involving the 1992 take-over by the Bosnian Serb Army and paramilitaries of the municipality of 
Foča. This case generated the first indictment exclusively addressing sexual violence (torture, 
rape, outrages upon dignity, and enslavement charged as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity). The charges stemmed from abuses committed in various improvised detention centers 
(some in hotels and private homes) where Muslim girls and women were repeatedly raped by 
occupation forces. Kunarac, the commander of a special reconnaissance unit of the Bosnian Serb 
Army, voluntarily surrendered to the ICTY in 1998; the multinational Stabilization Force in 
Bosnia (SFOR) arrested his co-defendants in 1999. In the opinion below, the Trial Chamber sets 
forth the elements of torture under the ICTY Statute. The Appeals Chamber‘s opinion on rape as 
torture follows.  
 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT–96–23 & 23–1, Judgement (Feb. 22, 2001) In the 
Trial Chamber 
 
465. Torture has been charged against the three accused as a violation of the laws or 
customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute and as a crime against humanity under Article 5 of 
the Statute. * * *   
466. Torture is prohibited under both conventional and customary international law and it 
is prohibited both in times of peace and during an armed conflict. The prohibition can be said to 
constitute a norm of jus cogens. However, relatively few attempts have been made at defining the 
offence of torture outside of human rights instruments. * * * 
 467. Because of the paucity of precedent in the field of international humanitarian law, 
the Tribunal has, on many occasions, had recourse to instruments and practices developed in the 
field of human rights law. Because of their resemblance, in terms of goals, values and 
terminology, such recourse is generally a welcome and needed assistance to determine the 
content of customary international law in the field of humanitarian law. With regard to certain of 
its aspects, international humanitarian law can be said to have fused with human rights law. 
 468. The Trial Chamber in Furundžija held that "[i]nternational law, while outlawing 
torture in armed conflict, does not provide a definition of the prohibition." That Trial Chamber 
consequently turned to human rights law to determine the definition of torture under customary 
international law. The Trial Chamber, however, pointed out that it should "identify or spell out 
some specific elements that pertain to torture as considered from the specific viewpoint of 
international criminal law relating to armed conflicts." 
 469. The Trial Chamber agrees with this approach. The absence of an express definition 
of torture under international humanitarian law does not mean that this body of law should be 
ignored altogether. The definition of an offence is largely a function of the environment in which 
it develops. Although it may not provide its own explicit definition of torture, international 
humanitarian law does provide some important definitional aspects of this offence. 
 470. In attempting to define an offence under international humanitarian law, the Trial 
Chamber must be mindful of the specificity of this body of law. In particular, when referring to 
definitions which have been given in the context of human rights law, the Trial Chamber will 
have to consider two crucial structural differences between these two bodies of law: 
 
(i) Firstly, the role and position of the state as an actor is completely different in both 
regimes. Human rights law is essentially born out of the abuses of the state over its citizens and 
out of the need to protect the latter from state-organized or state-sponsored violence. 
Humanitarian law aims at placing restraints on the conduct of warfare so as to diminish its effects 
on the victims of the hostilities. In the human rights context, the state is the ultimate guarantor of 
the rights protected and has both duties and a responsibility for the observance of those rights. In 
the event that the state violates those rights or fails in its responsibility to protect the rights, it can 
be called to account and asked to take appropriate measures to put an end to the infringements. 
In the field of international humanitarian law, and in particular in the context of 
international prosecutions, the role of the state is, when it comes to accountability, peripheral. 
Individual criminal responsibility for violation of international humanitarian law does not depend 
on the participation of the state and, conversely, its participation in the commission of the offence 
is no defense to the perpetrator.
1175
 Moreover, international humanitarian law purports to apply 
equally to and expressly bind all parties to the armed conflict whereas, in contrast, human rights 
law generally applies to only one party, namely the state involved, and its agents. 
 This distinction can be illustrated by two recent American decisions of the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered under the Alien Torts Claims Act. The Act gives 
jurisdiction to American district courts for any civil action by an alien for a tort committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. In the first decision, In re 
Filártiga, the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit held that "deliberate torture perpetrated 
under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of 
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties." This decision was only concerned with 
the situation of an individual vis-à-vis a state, either his national state or a foreign state. In a later 
decision in Kadić v. Karadžić, the same court made it clear that the body of law which it applied 
in the Filártiga case was customary international law of human rights and that, according to the 
Court of Appeals, in the human rights context torture is proscribed by international law only 
when committed by state officials or under the color of the law. The court added, however, that 
atrocities including torture are actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act regardless of state 
participation to the extent that the criminal acts were committed in pursuit of genocide or war 
crimes. 
(ii) Secondly, that part of international criminal law applied by the Tribunal is a penal law 
regime. It sets one party, the prosecutor, against another, the defendant. In the field of 
international human rights, the respondent is the state. Structurally, this has been expressed by 
the fact that human rights law establishes lists of protected rights whereas international criminal 
law establishes lists of offences. 
 
 471. The Trial Chamber is therefore wary not to embrace too quickly and too easily 
concepts and notions developed in a different legal context. The Trial Chamber is of the view 
that notions developed in the field of human rights can be transposed in international 
humanitarian law only if they take into consideration the specificities of the latter body of law. 
The Trial Chamber now turns more specifically to the definition of the crime of torture. 
 
 472. The Trial Chamber in the Delalić case considered that the definition contained in the 
Torture Convention "reflects a consensus which the Trial Chamber considers to be representative 
of customary international law." The Trial Chamber in the Furundžija case shared that view and 
held that there was general acceptance of the main elements contained in the definition set out in 
Article 1 of the Torture Convention. 
 473. This Trial Chamber notes, however, that Article 1 of the Torture Convention makes 
it abundantly clear that its definition of torture is limited in scope and was meant to apply only 
"for the purposes of this Convention." In addition, paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Torture 
Convention states that this Article is "without prejudice to any international instrument or 
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Art. 7(2) of the [ICTY] Statute states that: "The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of 
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
nor mitigate punishment." 
 
national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application." Therefore, 
insofar as other international instruments or national laws give the individual broader protection, 
he or she shall be entitled to benefit from it. This, and the fact that the definition was meant to 
apply only in the context of the Convention, are elements which should be kept in mind when 
considering the possibility that the definition of the Torture Convention produced an extra-
conventional effect. * * * 
 478. Article 3 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention" or "Convention") provides that no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The European Court of 
Human Rights ("ECHR") held that the concept of torture attaches a special stigma to deliberate 
inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. The European Commission of 
Human Rights held that torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of inhuman 
treatment which is directed at obtaining information or confessions, or at inflicting a punishment. 
The three main elements of the definition of torture under the European Convention are thus the 
level of severity of the ill-treatment, the deliberate nature of the act, and the specific purpose 
behind the act. The requirement that the state or one of its officials take part in the act is a general 
requirement of the Convention—not a definitional element of the act of torture—which applies 
to each and every prohibition contained in the Convention. Article 1 of the Convention, which 
provides that the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention, is clearly addressed to member 
states, not to individuals. The ECHR is not a criminal court, which determines individual 
criminal responsibility, but an organ whose mandate is to determine state compliance with its 
obligations under the Convention. 
 479. The Trial Chamber notes, however, the ECHR's jurisprudence which has held that 
Article 3 of the Convention may also apply in situations where organs or agents of the state are 
not involved in the violation of the rights protected under Article 3. For example, in HLR v. 
France, the Court held that 
 
Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, the Court does not rule out the 
possibility that Article 3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger emanates 
from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials.
1191
 
 
 480. Article 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") 
provides that no one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. The Human Rights Committee held that the protection offered by Article 7 of the 
ICCPR was not limited to acts committed by or at the instigation of public officials but that it 
also possessed horizontal effects, and that states should therefore protect individuals from 
interference by private parties. The Committee stated the following: "It is also the duty of public 
authorities to ensure protection by law against such treatment even when committed by persons 
acting outside or without any official authority." 
 481. In a later Comment of 3 April 1992, the Human Rights Committee stated that 
 
[i]t is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and 
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HLR v. France, 29 Apr. 1997, Reports 1997–III, p. 758, para. 40. 
 
other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether 
inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a 
private capacity.
1193
 
 
 482. The Trial Chamber in Furundžija held that a conventional provision could have an 
extra-conventional effect to the extent that it codifies or contributes to developing or crystallizing 
customary international law. In view of the international instruments and jurisprudence reviewed 
above, the Trial Chamber is of the view that the definition of torture contained in the Torture 
Convention cannot be regarded as the definition of torture under customary international law 
which is binding regardless of the context in which it is applied. The definition of the Torture 
Convention was meant to apply at an inter-state level and was, for that reason, directed at the 
states' obligations. The definition was also meant to apply only in the context of that Convention, 
and only to the extent that other international instruments or national laws did not give the 
individual a broader or better protection. The Trial Chamber, therefore, holds that the definition 
of torture contained in Article 1 of the Torture Convention can only serve, for present purposes, 
as an interpretational aid. 
 483. Three elements of the definition of torture contained in the Torture Convention are, 
however, uncontentious and are accepted as representing the status of customary international 
law on the subject: 
 
(i) Torture consists of the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental. 
 
(ii) This act or omission must be intentional. 
 
(iii) The act must be instrumental to another purpose, in the sense that the infliction of 
pain must be aimed at reaching a certain goal. 
 
 484. On the other hand, three elements remain contentious: 
 
(i) The list of purposes the pursuit of which could be regarded as illegitimate and coming 
within the realm of the definition of torture. 
 
(ii) The necessity, if any, for the act to be committed in connection with an armed 
conflict. 
 
(iii) The requirement, if any, that the act be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. 
 
 485. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the following purposes have become part of 
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General Comment 20/44 of 3 April 1992 [Prohibition of Torture], para. 2. [Ed.: General Comments are 
authoritative interpretations of treaties by expert bodies charged with treaty enforcement roughly analogous to an 
advisory opinion].  
 
customary international law: (a) obtaining information or a confession, (b) punishing, 
intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, (c) discriminating, on any ground, against 
the victim or a third person. There are some doubts as to whether other purposes have come to be 
recognised under customary international law. The issue does not need to be resolved here, 
because the conduct of the accused is appropriately subsumable under the above-mentioned 
purposes. 
 486. There is no requirement under customary international law that the conduct must be 
solely perpetrated for one of the prohibited purposes. As was stated by the Trial Chamber in the 
Delalić case, the prohibited purpose must simply be part of the motivation behind the conduct 
and need not be the predominant or sole purpose. 
 487. Secondly, the nature of the relationship between the underlying offence—torture—
and the armed conflict depends, under the Tribunal's Statute, on the qualification of the offence, 
as a grave breach, a war crime or a crime against humanity. If, for example, torture is charged as 
a violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber will 
have to be satisfied that the act was closely related to the hostilities. If, on the other hand, torture 
is charged as a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber will 
have to be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that there existed an armed conflict at the relevant 
time and place. 
 488. Thirdly, the Torture Convention requires that the pain or suffering be inflicted by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. As was already mentioned, the Trial Chamber must consider each element 
of the definition "from the specific viewpoint of international criminal law relating to armed 
conflicts." In practice, this means that the Trial Chamber must identify those elements of the 
definition of torture under human rights law which are extraneous to international criminal law as 
well as those which are present in the latter body of law but possibly absent from the human 
rights regime. 
 489. The Trial Chamber draws a clear distinction between those provisions which are 
addressed to states and their agents and those provisions which are addressed to individuals. 
Violations of the former provisions result exclusively in the responsibility of the state to take the 
necessary steps to redress or make reparation for the negative consequences of the criminal 
actions of its agents. On the other hand, violations of the second set of provisions may provide 
for individual criminal responsibility, regardless of an individual's official status. While human 
rights norms are almost exclusively of the first sort, humanitarian provisions can be of both or 
sometimes of mixed nature. This has been pointed out by the Trial Chamber in the Furundžija 
case: 
Under current international humanitarian law, in addition to individual criminal liability, 
State responsibility may ensue as a result of State officials engaging in torture or failing to 
prevent torture or to prevent torturers. If carried out as an extensive practice of State 
officials, torture amounts to a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international 
obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, thus constituting a 
particularly wrongful act generating State responsibility.
1202
 
 
 490. Several humanitarian law provisions fall within the first category of legal norms, 
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 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case IT–95–17/1–T, Judgement,  para. 142 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
 
expressly providing for the possibility of state responsibility for the acts of its agents: thus, 
Article 75 ("Fundamental Guarantees") of Additional Protocol I provides that acts of violence to 
the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons such as murder, torture, corporal 
punishment and mutilation, outrages upon personal dignity, the taking of hostages, collective 
punishments and threats to commit any of those acts when committed by civilian or by military 
agents of the state could engage the state's responsibility. The requirement that the acts be 
committed by an agent of the state applies equally to any of the offences provided under 
paragraph 2 of Article 75 and in particular, but no differently, to the crime of torture. 
 491. This provision should be contrasted with Article 4 ("Fundamental Guarantees") of 
Additional Protocol II. The latter provision provides for a list of offences broadly similar to that 
contained in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I but does not contain any reference to agents of 
the state. The offences provided for in this Article can, therefore, be committed by any 
individual, regardless of his official status, although, if the perpetrator is an agent of the state he 
could additionally engage the responsibility of the state. The Commentary to Additional Protocol 
II dealing specifically with the offences mentioned in Article 4(2)(a) namely, violence to the life, 
health, or physical or mental well being of persons in particular murder and cruel treatment such 
as torture, states: 
 
The most widespread form of torture is practiced by public officials for the purpose of 
obtaining confessions, but torture is not only condemned as a judicial institution; the act 
of torture is reprehensible in itself, regardless of its perpetrator, and cannot be justified 
in any circumstances.
1204
 
 
 492. The Trial Chamber also notes Article 12 ("Protection and Care") of 1949 Geneva 
Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, which provides that members of the armed forces and other defined persons who are 
wounded or sick shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. In particular, paragraph 2 
of this Article provides that the wounded or sick shall not be tortured. The Commentary to this 
paragraph adds the following: 
 
The obligation [of respect and protection mentioned in paragraph 1] applies to all 
combatants in an army, whoever they may be, and also to non-combatants. It applies also 
to civilians, in regard to whom Article 18 specifically states: "The civilian population 
shall respect these wounded and sick, and in particular abstain from offering them 
violence." A clear statement to that effect was essential in view of the special character 
which modern warfare is liable to assume (dispersion of combatants, isolation of units, 
mobility of fronts, etc.) and which may lead to closer and more frequent contacts between 
military and civilians. It was necessary, therefore, and more necessary today than in the 
past, that the principle of the inviolability of wounded combatants should be brought 
home, not only to the fighting forces, but also to the general public. That principle is one 
of the fine flowers of civilization, and should be implanted firmly in public morals and in 
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Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 1373–1374 (1987). 
 
the public conscience.
1207
 
 
 493. A violation of one of the relevant articles of the Statute will engage the perpetrator's 
individual criminal responsibility. In this context, the participation of the state becomes 
secondary and, generally, peripheral. With or without the involvement of the state, the crime 
committed remains of the same nature and bears the same consequences. The involvement of the 
state in a criminal enterprise generally results in the availability of extensive resources to carry 
out the criminal activities in question and therefore greater risk for the potential victims. It may 
also trigger the application of a different set of rules, in the event that its involvement renders the 
armed conflict international. However, the involvement of the state does not modify or limit the 
guilt or responsibility of the individual who carried out the crimes in question. This principle was 
clearly stated in the Flick judgment [against German industrialists]: 
 
But the International Military Tribunal [at Nuremburg] was dealing with officials and 
agencies of the State, and it is argued that individuals holding no public offices and not 
representing the State, do not, and should not, come within the class of persons criminally 
responsible for a breach of international law. It is asserted that international law is a 
matter wholly outside the work, interest and knowledge of private individuals. The 
distinction is unsound. International law, as such, binds every citizen just as does ordinary 
municipal law. Acts adjudged criminal when done by an officer of the Government are 
criminal also when done by a private individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not 
in quality. The offender in either case is charged with personal wrong and punishment 
falls on the offender in propria persona [―in his own person‖]. The application of 
international law to individuals is no novelty. [...] There is no justification for a limitation 
of responsibility to public officials.
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 494. Likewise, the doctrine of "act of State," by which an individual would be shielded 
from criminal responsibility for an act he or she committed in the name of or as an agent of a 
state, is no defense under international criminal law. This has been the case since the Second 
World War, if not before. Articles 1 and 7 of the Statute make it clear that the identity and 
official status of the perpetrator is irrelevant insofar as it relates to accountability. Neither can 
obedience to orders be relied upon as a defense, playing a mitigating role only at the sentencing 
stage. In short, there is no privilege under international criminal law which would shield state 
representatives or agents from the reach of individual criminal responsibility. On the contrary, 
acting in an official capacity could constitute an aggravating circumstance when it comes to 
sentencing, because the official illegitimately used and abused a power which was conferred 
upon him or her for legitimate purposes. 
 495. The Trial Chamber also points out that those conventions, in particular the human 
rights conventions, consider torture per se while the Tribunal's Statute criminalizes it as a form 
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of war crime, crime against humanity or grave breach. The characteristic trait of the offence in 
this context is to be found in the nature of the act committed rather than in the status of the 
person who committed it.
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 496. The Trial Chamber concludes that the definition of torture under international 
humanitarian law does not comprise the same elements as the definition of torture generally 
applied under human rights law. In particular, the Trial Chamber is of the view that the presence 
of a state official or of any other authority-wielding person in the torture process is not necessary 
for the offence to be regarded as torture under international humanitarian law. 
 
 497. On the basis of what has been said, the Trial Chamber holds that, in the field of 
international humanitarian law, the elements of the offence of torture, under customary 
international law are as follows: 
 
(i) The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental. 
 
(ii) The act or omission must be intentional. 
 
(iii) The act or omission must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at 
punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at 
discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person. 
 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT–96–23 & 23–1A, Judgement (June 12, 2002) In 
the Appeals Chamber  
 
134. Neither Appellant challenges the Trial Chamber‘s definition of torture. Indeed, the 
Appellants seem to accept the conclusions of the Trial Chamber identifying the crime of torture 
on the basis of three elements, these being respectively an intentional act, inflicting suffering, and 
the existence of a prohibited purpose. Nonetheless, they assert that these three constitutive 
elements of the crime of torture have not been proven beyond reasonable doubt in relation to 
either Kunarac or Vuković and that their convictions were thus ill-founded. 
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135. With regard to the first element of the crime of torture, the Appellant Kunarac 
contends that he committed no act which could inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
and that the arguments raised by the Prosecutor, as well as the case-law to which she refers, are 
not sufficient to justify the findings of the Trial Chamber that some of Kunarac‘s victims 
experienced such mental pain or suffering. Kunarac states that he never asserted that rape 
victims, in general, could not suffer, but rather that, in the instant case, no witness showed the 
effects of physical or mental pain or suffering. In Kunarac‘s view, therefore, the first element of 
the crime of torture—the infliction of severe pain or suffering—is not met in his case. 
136. * * * Appellant Vuković further challenges his conviction for torture through rape in 
the form of vaginal penetration on the basis that [victim] FWS-50, who was allegedly raped by 
Vuković, did not mention the use of force or threats. The Appellant appears to conclude from the 
absence of evidence of the use of physical force that the alleged rape of FWS-50 could not have 
resulted in severe physical pain or suffering on the part of FWS-50. The Appellant thus asserts 
that the first element of the crime of torture will only be satisfied if there is evidence that the 
alleged rape resulted in severe mental pain or suffering on the part of FWS-50. In this regard, the 
Appellant first contends that FWS-50 did not claim to have been inflicted with severe mental 
pain or suffering. Secondly, the Appellant seems to argue that, objectively, FWS-50 would not 
have experienced severe mental pain or suffering as a result of the alleged rape, as she had been 
raped on previous occasions by other perpetrators. Thirdly, the Appellant notes that two Defence 
expert witnesses testified that they did not find that the victims of the alleged rapes had suffered 
severe consequences. Finally, the Appellant states that the Prosecutor failed to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that FWS-50 was inflicted with severe physical or mental pain or suffering. For 
these reasons, the Appellant Vuković contends that the first element of the crime of torture—the 
infliction of severe pain or suffering—is not met in his case and that the Trial Chamber erred in 
its application of the law and in finding him guilty of the crime of torture. 
137. The Appellants also submit that they did not intend to inflict pain or suffering, rather 
that their aims were purely sexual in nature. The Appellants, therefore, argue that the second 
element of the crime of torture—the deliberate nature of the act or omission—has not been 
proven in either of their cases. 
138. Both Appellants deny having pursued any of the prohibited purposes listed in the 
definition of the crime of torture, in particular, the discriminatory purpose. Kunarac further states 
that he did not have sexual relations with any of the victims in order to obtain information or a 
confession or to punish, intimidate or coerce the victim or a third person, or to discriminate on 
any ground whatsoever. Vuković seeks to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred when it 
established that his acts were committed for a discriminatory purpose because the victim was 
Muslim. Both Appellants thus conclude that the third constitutive element of the crime of 
torture—the pursuance of a prohibited purpose—was not established in their cases and that the 
Trial Chamber erroneously applied the law and committed an error in finding each guilty of the 
crime of torture. 
139. The [Prosecutor] Respondent claims that the pain and suffering inflicted on FWS-50 
through the Appellant Vuković‘s sexual acts was established. She asserts that, after leaving Foča, 
FWS-50 went to a physician who noted physiological and psychological symptoms resulting 
from rape, that she felt the need to go to a psychiatrist, and that she testified to having 
experienced suffering and pain when orally raped by Vuković. 
140. The Respondent asserts that the crime of torture, as defined by customary 
international law, does not require that the perpetrator committed the act in question with the 
intent to inflict severe physical or mental suffering, but rather that the perpetrator committed an 
intentional act for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, or to punish, intimidate 
or coerce the victim or a third person, or to discriminate on any ground whatsoever, and that, as a 
consequence, the victim suffered. There is thus no need to establish that the Appellants 
committed such acts with the knowledge or intention that those acts would cause severe pain or 
suffering. 
141. According to the Respondent and as noted by the Trial Chamber, there is no 
requirement under customary international law for the act of the perpetrator to be committed 
solely for one of the prohibited purposes listed in the definition of torture. The Respondent also 
claims that the Trial Chamber reasonably concluded that the Appellant Vuković intended to 
discriminate against his victim because she was Muslim. She further submits that, in this case, all 
the acts of torture could be considered to be discriminatory, based on religion, ethnicity or sex. 
Moreover, all the acts of sexual torture perpetrated on the victims resulted in their intimidation or 
humiliation.  
142. With reference to the Torture Convention and the case-law of the Tribunal and the 
International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR), the Trial Chamber adopted a definition based 
on the following constitutive elements:  
(i)    The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental. 
(ii)   The act or omission must be intentional. 
(iii)   The act or omission must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at 
punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at 
discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.* * *  
149. Torture is constituted by an act or an omission giving rise to ―severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental,‖ but there are no more specific requirements which allow 
an exhaustive classification and enumeration of acts which may constitute torture. Existing case-
law has not determined the absolute degree of pain required for an act to amount to torture. 
150. The Appeals Chamber holds that the assumption of the Appellants that suffering 
must be visible, even long after the commission of the crimes in question, is erroneous. Generally 
speaking, some acts establish per se the suffering of those upon whom they were inflicted. Rape 
is obviously such an act. The Trial Chamber could only conclude that such suffering occurred 
even without a medical certificate. Sexual violence necessarily gives rise to severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, and in this way justifies its characterisation as an act of 
torture. 
151. Severe pain or suffering, as required by the definition of the crime of torture, can 
thus be said to be established once rape has been proved, since the act of rape necessarily implies 
such pain or suffering. The Appeals Chamber thus holds that the severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, of the victims cannot be challenged and that the Trial Chamber 
reasonably concluded that that pain or suffering was sufficient to characterise the acts of the 
Appellants as acts of torture. The Appellants‘ grounds of appeal in this respect are unfounded 
and, therefore, rejected. 
152. The argument that the Appellant Vuković has not been charged with any act 
inflicting severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is erroneous since he is charged 
with the crime of torture arising from rape. Moreover, the fact alleged in the Appeal Brief, that 
[the] Indictment does not refer to the use of physical force, does not mean that there was none. 
153. The Appellants argue that the intention of the perpetrator was of a sexual nature, 
which, in their view, is inconsistent with an intent to commit the crime of torture. In this respect, 
the Appeals Chamber wishes to assert the important distinction between ―intent‖ and 
―motivation.‖ The Appeals Chamber holds that, even if the perpetrator‘s motivation is entirely 
sexual, it does not follow that the perpetrator does not have the intent to commit an act of torture 
or that his conduct does not cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, since 
such pain or suffering is a likely and logical consequence of his conduct. In view of the 
definition, it is important to establish whether a perpetrator intended to act in a way which, in the 
normal course of events, would cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, to his 
victims. The Appeals Chamber concurs with the findings of the Trial Chamber that the 
Appellants did intend to act in such a way as to cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, to their victims, in pursuance of one of the purposes prohibited by the definition of the 
crime of torture, in particular the purpose of discrimination. 
154. The Appellant Kunarac claims that the requisite intent for torture, alleged by the 
Prosecutor, has not been proven. Vuković also challenges the discriminatory purpose ascribed to 
his acts. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Appellants have not demonstrated why the 
conclusions of the Trial Chamber on this point are unreasonable or erroneous. The Appeals 
Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber rightly concluded that the Appellants deliberately 
committed the acts of which they were accused and did so with the intent of discriminating 
against their victims because they were Muslim. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber notes that in 
addition to a discriminatory purpose, the acts were committed against one of the victims with the 
purpose of obtaining information. The Appeals Chamber further finds that, in any case, all acts 
were committed for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the victims. 
155. Furthermore, in response to the argument that the Appellant‘s avowed purpose of 
sexual gratification is not listed in the definition of torture, the Appeals Chamber restates the 
conclusions of the Trial Chamber that acts need not have been perpetrated solely for one of the 
purposes prohibited by international law. If one prohibited purpose is fulfilled by the conduct, the 
fact that such conduct was also intended to achieve a non-listed purpose (even one of a sexual 
nature) is immaterial. 
156. The Appeals Chamber thus finds that the legal conclusions and findings of the Trial 
Chamber are well-founded and rejects all grounds of appeal relating to the crime of torture. 
 
NOTES & QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Case Outcome. The three co-accused were convicted of many of the crimes charged, 
including cumulative crimes-against-humanity convictions for rape, enslavement, and torture 
with respect to two defendants. In regard to the cumulative convictions, the Tribunal reasoned:  
 
Applying the approach adopted by the Appeals Chamber in the Delalić case, convictions 
for rape and torture under either Article 3 [the laws and customs of war] or Article 5 
[crimes against humanity] based on the same conduct would be permissible. Comparing 
the elements of rape and torture under either Article 3 or Article 5, a materially distinct 
element of rape vis-à-vis torture is the sexual penetration element. A materially distinct 
element of torture vis-à-vis rape is the severe infliction of pain or suffering aimed at 
obtaining information or a confession, punishing, intimidating, coercing or discriminating 
against the victim or a third person. 
 
Kunarac Trial Chamber Judgement, supra, at para. 557. The theory behind cumulative 
convictions will be taken up in Chapter 11. The case is also notable as the first decision by the 
ICTY convicting a defendant for rape as a crime against humanity. The defendants‘ convictions 
and sentences were affirmed on appeal in the second opinion excerpted above. The defendants 
are serving the remainder of their sentences (ranging from 10-28 years) in Norway and Germany.  
 2. State Actors. The defendants were part of the Bosnian Serb Army, an ethnically-based 
militia fighting on behalf of the self-proclaimed Republika Srspka against the Bosnian army for 
the accession of parts of the newly independent Bosnia-Herzegovina with the rump Yugoslavia. 
Given their affiliation with Srspka, should the Trial Chamber‘s opinion concerning non-state 
actors be considered dicta? Is Srspka a state even though it was not formally recognized as such 
by any other state?  The Serb enclave of Bosnia (the Republika Srpska) had many features of a 
state, including a legislative body, an elected head of state (Radovan Karadžić), control of 
territory, an army, and a constitution. For one articulation of the elements of statehood, see 
Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (defining 
statehood in terms of a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity 
to enter into relations with other states but not international recognition), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp. Following the Dayton Peace Accords, 
Republika Srpska became a political-territorial division within Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a civil 
suit brought against him in the Second Circuit, Karadžić argued that the court had no jurisdiction 
over him for claims of war crimes and genocide because international law norms bind only states 
and persons acting under color of state law, not private actors. At the same time, Karadžić 
asserted that he was the president of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska and thus entitled to 
head-of-state immunity. The Second Circuit ruled that some international law rules are actionable 
against both state and non-state actors, including the prohibitions against war crimes and 
genocide. At the same time, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to prove that 
Karadžić‘s regime satisfied the criteria for a state, or that he and his subordinates were acting in 
concert with the state of Yugoslavia, in order to prevail on those international law violations that 
do require state action. See Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Cir. 1995).       
 3. State Action. The ICTY has not been consistent in its rulings on the state action 
requirement for torture charges. Both the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT–
96–21–T, Judgement, para. 494 (Nov. 16, 1998), and the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Furundžija, Case No. IT–95–17/1, Judgement, para. 111 (Dec. 10, 1998), required a showing of 
the involvement of a public official or, in the words of the Appeals Chamber in Furundžija, 
someone acting in a "non-private" capacity. While the definition of torture adopted by the 
Kunarac Trial Chamber was not contested on appeal, the Appeals Chamber did agree (in a 
paragraph we did not excerpt above) that "the public official requirement is not a requirement 
under customary international law in relation to the criminal responsibility of an individual for 
torture outside of the framework of the Torture Convention." Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. 
IT–96–23 and IT–96–23/1–A, Judgement, para. 148 (Feb. 22, 2002). See also Prosecutor v. 
Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, para. 139 (Nov. 2, 2001). Does the Kunarac decision mean that 
any non-state actor who intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on an individual in 
furtherance of one of the prohibited purposes is liable for torture under international criminal 
law? Given that the Torture Convention defines torture in terms of state action, does this opinion 
violate the principle of legality and the prohibition against ex post facto law? 
4. The Committee Against Torture and State Action. The Committee Against Torture 
is the body created to monitor compliance with the Convention Against Torture. State parties are 
required to submit periodic reports to the Committee, and individuals may bring petitions under 
the Convention against states that have agreed to be the subject of such claims. The Committee 
Against Torture has relaxed the state action requirement of the definition of torture in cases 
involving countries without an effective government. Thus, in the context of a claim brought by a 
Somali citizen challenging an Australian decision to return him to Somalia, the Committee found 
that a fear of severe ill treatment at the hands of groups that have set up "quasi-governmental 
institutions" and that "de facto ... exercise of certain prerogatives that are comparable to those 
normally exercised by legitimate governments" triggered Australia‘s non-refoulement 
obligations. Elmi v. Australia, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (1999), para. 6.5. A few years later, the 
Committee found that the recent creation of a Transitional National Government in Somalia 
precluded a finding that acts committed by non-state actors like those at issue in Elmi could 
qualify as torture under the Convention definition. H.M.H.I. v. Australia, CAT/C/28/D/177/2001 
(2002), para. 6.4. In addition, states may bear responsibility for acts of torture committed by 
private actors when they fail to ―exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecutor and 
punish‖ such non-state actors. Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2, Implementation 
of Article 2 by State Parties, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/rev. 4 (2007). (In human rights law, 
general comments are authoritative interpretations of a treaty by the expert bodies charged with 
overseeing its implementation). Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has held, in the 
context of the prohibition of returning someone to a state where she may be tortured, that the 
prohibition against refoulement still applies even if the risk emanates from private groups or 
individuals. HLR v. France, III Eur. Ct HR 745; 26 EHRR 29 (1997).  
 5. A Feminist Critique. Should torture distinguish between "private" and "public" acts or 
motivations? Feminist scholars have long argued that the distinction between the public and 
private spheres privileges men and discriminates against women. This discrimination is reflected 
in the different treatment of assaults against individuals within private homes (which are 
predominantly directed against women and children), and assaults against individuals within 
state custody (which affect women and men, but is the primary place where men are the objects 
of such violence). For a discussion of the discriminatory impact of this distinction under 
international human rights law in the context of torture and its purpose requirement, see Rhonda 
Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 Colum. 
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 291 (1994). Ela Grdinic argues that domestic violence qualifies as torture 
under the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the now-defunct European 
Commission of Human Rights. Ela Grdinic, Application of the Elements of Torture and Other 
Forms of Ill–Treatment, as Defined by the European Court and Commission of Human Rights, to 
the Incidents of Domestic Violence, 23 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 217 (2000). If the 
distinction between acts of torture by state actors and acts of torture by private actors were 
eliminated, would every act of domestic torture implicate international criminal law? For a more 
general treatment of the feminist critique of the public/private distinction and international 
human rights law, see Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the 
Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 87 (1993). 
6. Prohibited Acts. Why does the Torture Convention include a general definition 
without a list (exemplary or closed) of acts deemed torture per se? As you review the materials in 
this Chapter consider what acts you would include on such a list. In 1985, the United Nations 
established a Special Rapporteur on Torture with a mandate to examine allegations of torture in 
any state in the world. In a 1986 report, the Special Rapporteur identified the following acts as 
constituting torture: beatings; extraction of nails, teeth, etc.; burns; electric shocks; suspension; 
suffocation; exposure to excessive light or noise; sexual aggression; administration of drugs in 
detention or psychiatric institutions; prolonged denial of rest or sleep; prolonged denial of food; 
prolonged denial of sufficient hygiene; prolonged denial of medical assistance; total isolation and 
sensory deprivation; being kept in constant uncertainty in terms of space and time; threats to 
torture or kill relatives; total abandonment; and simulated executions. Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4 /1986/15, para. 119 (1986). 
7. Purpose. What justification is there for including a purpose element in the definition 
of torture? Should this element be removed? Restricted? Expanded? The language of the 
requirement, "for such purposes as," raises the question of whether the listed purposes are 
exhaustive. If the list is read exclusively, what types of torture are excluded from the 
Convention's definition? The ICTY has held that the Torture Convention‘s list of purposes is not 
exhaustive: 
 
470. The use of the words "for such purposes" in the customary definition of 
torture, indicate that the various listed purposes do not constitute an exhaustive list, and 
should be regarded as merely representative. Further, there is no requirement that the 
conduct must be solely perpetrated for a prohibited purpose. Thus, in order for this 
requirement to be met, the prohibited purpose must simply be part of the motivation 
behind the conduct and need not be the predominating or sole purpose. 
 471. A fundamental distinction regarding the purpose for which torture is inflicted 
is that between a "prohibited purpose" and one which is purely private. The rationale 
behind this distinction is that the prohibition on torture is not concerned with private 
conduct, which is ordinarily sanctioned under national law. In particular, rape and other 
sexual assaults have often been labeled as "private," thus precluding them from being 
punished under national or international law. However, such conduct could meet the 
purposive requirements of torture as, during armed conflicts, the purposive elements of 
intimidation, coercion, punishment or discrimination can often be integral components of 
behavior, thus bringing the relevant conduct within the definition. Accordingly, 
 
[o]nly in exceptional cases should it therefore be possible to conclude that the 
infliction of severe pain or suffering by a public official would not constitute 
torture ... on the ground that he acted for purely private reasons. 
 
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT–96–21–T, Judgement (Nov. 16, 1998) (citing J. Herman 
Burgess and Hans Danelius, A Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 119 (1988)). 
8. Specific Intent, General Intent & Motive. Recall that the concept of specific intent 
encompasses the intent to produce a particular consequence or harm as a result of the crime. For 
example, the domestic crime of larceny/theft involves the taking of personal property with the 
intent to permanently deprive its rightful owner of it. In order to convict a person of larceny, the 
prosecutor must prove that the defendant intended to keep the property permanently, not just that 
the defendant took the property. In international criminal law, genocide is the classic specific 
intent crime—it requires the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group. By 
contrast, a general intent crime only requires a showing that the defendant intended to commit the 
act that is prohibited by the law. As mental states with which an act may be committed, both 
forms of intent are thus distinct from an individual‘s motive, which is the reason that a person 
acts (or fails to act). Domestic systems that recognize the concept of specific intent allow the trier 
of fact to infer the intent from the facts in the case. In particular, the doctrine of presumed intent 
holds that individuals are presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their acts. 
Does the Torture Convention define torture in terms of specific intent, general intent, motive or 
some combination of the three? How is this question answered by the Kunarac case? Is the 
Appeals Chamber clear on the distinction between intent and motive? Does the Trial Chamber 
significantly alter the Torture Convention‘s definition of torture with its analysis? 
 9. Severity: Torture Versus Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. The 
Convention Against Torture prohibits both torture and "other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment‖ (CIDT), but only requires that states criminalize torture (Articles 4 and 5). 
International humanitarian law also contains prohibitions of torture and other forms of cruel 
treatment, and these acts also constitute enumerated crimes against humanity. The Rwanda 
Tribunal Statute thus criminalizes "cruel treatment," "outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment," and "other inhumane acts." See ICTR Statute, 
Articles 3(i) (―other inhumane acts‖ constituting crimes against humanity), 4(a) (cruel treatment 
as a violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II), and 4(e) 
(outrages upon personal dignity as a violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocol II). See also ICTY Statute, Articles 2(b) (torture and inhuman treatment as grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and 5 (torture and ―other inhumane acts‖ as constituting 
crimes against humanity). How should international criminal law distinguish between acts of 
torture, other acts of cruel treatment that fall short of torture, and other harmful conduct that does 
not rise to the level of an international crime? 
 Consider the following excerpt. Radomir Kovać was convicted by the ICTY of crimes 
against humanity as part of the Kunarac case excerpted above. Kovać, a member of a military 
unit known as the ―Dragan Nikolić unit,‖ was charged with acts of rape, enslavement, and 
outrages upon personal dignity committed against a number of young women whom he kept in an 
apartment. The Trial Chamber found that the young women, who ranged in age from 15 to 25, 
"were frequently sexually assaulted and that they were beaten, threatened, psychologically 
oppressed and kept in constant fear," were required to "take care of the household chores, the 
cooking and the cleaning," were forced to dance naked, and their diet and hygiene were 
"completely neglected." Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT–96–23 & 23–1, Judgement, 
paras. 746–782 (Feb. 22, 2001). On appeal, Kovać challenged, among other things, his 
conviction for "outrages upon personal dignity," arguing that the Trial Chamber did not 
adequately define the acts that would qualify as the crime in question and that the Prosecution 
had neglected to establish his specific intent to humiliate or degrade the victims. The Appeals 
Chamber upheld Kovać's conviction and commented on the crime of "outrages upon personal 
dignity" as set forth below. 
 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT–96–23 & 23–1A, Judgement (June 12, 2002) In 
the Appeals Chamber 
 
 157. The Appellant Kovać submits that, since every humiliating or degrading act is not 
necessarily an outrage upon personal dignity, the acts likely to be outrages upon personal dignity 
must be defined, and he further argues that the Trial Chamber did not do so. 
158. Moreover, the Appellant asserts that to find a person guilty of outrages upon 
personal dignity, a specific intent to humiliate or degrade the victim must be established. In his 
opinion, the Trial Chamber did not prove beyond any reasonable doubt that he acted with the 
intention to humiliate his victims, as his objective was of an exclusively sexual nature. 
159. In response to the Appellant‘s claim that the Trial Chamber did not state which acts 
constituted outrages upon personal dignity, the Respondent recalls that the Trial Chamber 
considered that it had been proved beyond any reasonable doubt that, during their detention in 
Kovać‘s apartment, the victims were repeatedly raped, humiliated and degraded. That the victims 
were made to dance naked on a table, that they were ―lent‖ and sold to other men and that 
[witnesses] FWS-75 and FWS-87 were raped by Kovać while he was playing ―Swan Lake‖ were 
all correctly characterised by the Trial Chamber as outrages upon personal dignity. * * * 
 161. The Trial Chamber ruled that the crime of outrages upon personal dignity requires: 
 
(i) that the accused intentionally committed or participated in an act or an 
omission which would be generally considered to cause serious humiliation, 
degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity, and (ii) that he 
knew that the act or omission could have that effect. 
 
 162. Contrary to the claims of the Appellant, the Appeals Chamber considers that the 
Trial Chamber was not obliged to define the specific acts which may constitute outrages upon 
personal dignity. Instead, it properly presented the criteria which it used as a basis for measuring 
the humiliating or degrading character of an act or omission. The Trial Chamber, referring to the 
Aleksovski case, stated that the humiliation of the victim must be so intense that any reasonable 
person would be outraged. In coming to its conclusion, the Trial Chamber did not rely only on 
the victim's purely subjective evaluation of the act to establish whether there had been an outrage 
upon personal dignity, but used objective criteria to determine when an act constitutes a crime of 
outrages upon personal dignity. 
 163. In explaining that outrages upon personal dignity are constituted by "any act or 
omission which would be generally considered to cause serious humiliation, degradation or 
otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity," the Trial Chamber correctly defined the 
objective threshold for an act to constitute an outrage upon personal dignity. It was not obliged to 
list the acts which constitute outrages upon personal dignity. For this reason, this ground of 
appeal is dismissed. 
 164. According to the Trial Chamber, the crime of outrages upon personal dignity 
requires that the accused knew that his act or omission could cause serious humiliation, 
degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity. The Appellant, however, asserts 
that this crime requires that the accused knew that his act or omission would have such an effect. 
 165. The Trial Chamber carried out a detailed review of the case-law relating to the mens 
rea of the crime of outrages upon personal dignity. The Trial Chamber was never directly 
confronted with the specific question of whether the crime of outrages upon personal dignity 
requires a specific intent to humiliate or degrade or otherwise seriously attack human dignity. 
However, after reviewing the case-law, the Trial Chamber properly demonstrated that the crime 
of outrages upon personal dignity requires only knowledge of the "possible" consequences of the 
charged act or omission. The relevant paragraph of the Trial Judgment reads as follows: 
 
As the relevant act or omission for an outrage upon personal dignity is an act or omission 
which would be generally considered to cause serious humiliation, degradation or 
otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity, an accused must know that his act or 
omission is of that character—i.e., that it could cause serious humiliation, degradation or 
affront to human dignity. This is not the same as requiring that the accused knew of the 
actual consequences of the act. 
 
 166. Since the nature of the acts committed by the Appellant * * * undeniably reaches the 
objective threshold for the crime of outrages upon personal dignity set out in the Trial Judgment, 
the Trial Chamber correctly concluded that any reasonable person would have perceived his acts 
"to cause serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity." 
Therefore, it appears highly improbable that the Appellant was not, at the very least, aware that 
his acts could have such an effect. Consequently this ground of appeal is rejected. 
 
NOTES & QUESTIONS 
 
1. Other Outrages Upon Personal Dignity. In other cases, the ICTY found the 
following to also constitute outrages upon personal dignity: (1) subjecting individuals to 
inappropriate conditions of confinement, forcing individuals to engage in subservient acts or to 
relieve bodily functions in their clothing; and placing someone in fear of being subjected to 
physical, mental, or sexual violence (Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., Case No. IT–98–
30/1T, Judgement, para. 173 (Nov. 2, 2001)); and (2) using detainees as human shields or trench 
diggers (Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT–95–14/1T, Judgement, para. 229 (June 25, 1999); 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT–95–14–A, Judgement, paras. 653, 669 (July 29, 2004)). 
Would such acts constitute torture or CIDT under the Torture Convention or the Inter-American 
Convention on Torture? The International Criminal Court‘s Elements of Crimes provides further 
guidance on the definition of outrages upon personal dignity: 
 
•   The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more 
persons.  
•   The severity of the humiliation, degradation and other violation was of such a degree 
as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity.  
 
Does this formulation give sufficient notice to potential defendants of the prohibited conduct?  
 2. Lasting Impact of Harm. Should it matter whether the effect of the harm inflicted is 
long-lasting, or is a temporary impact sufficient? Consider the following ruling of the Trial 
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. 95–14/1T, Judgement, para. 56 (June 25, 1999): 
 
An outrage against personal dignity is an act which is animated by contempt for the 
human dignity of another person. The corollary is that the act must cause serious 
humiliation or degradation to the victim. It is not necessary for the act to directly harm the 
physical or mental well-being of the victim. It is enough that the act causes real and 
lasting suffering to the individual arising from the humiliation or ridicule. 
 
The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. 96–23 & 23/1–T, Judgement, para. 
501 (Feb. 22, 2001), disagreed with the Aleksovski decision on this point: 
 
Insofar as [Aleksovski] provides that an outrage upon personal dignity is an act which 
"cause[s] serious humiliation or degradation to the victim," the Trial Chamber agrees with 
it. However, the Trial Chamber would not agree with any indication from the passage 
above that this humiliation or degradation must cause "lasting suffering" to the victim. So 
long as the humiliation or degradation is real and serious, the Trial Chamber can see no 
reason why it would also have to be "lasting." In the view of the Trial Chamber, it is not 
open to regard the fact that a victim has recovered or is overcoming the effects of such an 
offence as indicating of itself that the relevant acts did not constitute an outrage upon 
personal dignity. Obviously, if the humiliation and suffering caused is only fleeting in 
nature, it may be difficult to accept that it is real and serious. However this does not 
suggest that any sort of minimum temporal requirement of the effects of an outrage upon 
personal dignity is an element of the offence. 
 
How do you think the disagreement between the two Trial Chambers should be resolved? Should 
the requirement of lasting impact be the same as for torture, or should "outrages upon personal 
dignity" be treated differently? Why? 
 3. Torture v. CIDT. The Committee Against Torture, which monitors compliance with 
the Torture Convention, has affirmed the obligations to prevent torture and CIDT are 
―interdependent, indivisible and interrelated.‖ Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2, 
Implementation of Article 2 by State Parties, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/rev. 4 (2007). Nigel 
Rodley, a former U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture, identified three elements distinguishing 
torture from CIDT: (1) the relative intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted; (2) the purpose for 
inflicting the pain or suffering; and (3) the status of the perpetrator as a state or private actor. Sir 
Nigel Rodley, The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law, in Current Legal Problems 467 
(Michael Freedman, ed. 2002). How should one measure severity? Should there be an objective 
test or a subjective test (along the lines of the famous ―eggshell skull‖ rules from torts) given that 
the long term effects of such conduct can vary from person-to-person, depending upon the 
individual‘s personal circumstances, age and general state of physical and mental health, support 
network, length of detention, etc.? Rodley has argued that it is "virtually impossible" to ascertain 
the level of severity required for an act to qualify as torture. Nigel Rodley, The Treatment of 
Prisoners Under International Law 98 (2d ed. 1999). The ICTY has created a case-by-case test 
that combines objective and subjective elements, further complicating the issue: 
 
In assessing the seriousness of any mistreatment, the objective severity of the harm 
inflicted must be considered, including the nature, purpose and consistency of the acts 
committed. Subjective criteria, such as the physical or mental condition of the victim, the 
effect of the treatment and, in some cases, factors such as the victim's age, sex, state of 
health and position of inferiority will also be relevant in assessing the gravity of the harm. 
Permanent injury is not a requirement for torture; evidence of the suffering need not even 
be visible after the commission of the crime. 
 
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT–99–36–T, Judgement, para. 484 (Sept. 1, 2004). Compare 
the test articulated by the Trial Chamber in Brdjanin with that of a different Trial Chamber: 
 
With respect to the assessment of the seriousness of the acts charged as torture, previous 
jurisprudence of the Tribunal has held that this should take into account all circumstances 
of the case and in particular the nature and context of the infliction of pain, the 
premeditation and institutionalization of the ill-treatment, the physical condition of the 
victim, the manner and the method used and the position of inferiority of the victim. Also 
relevant to the Chamber's assessment is the physical or mental effect of the treatment on 
the victim, the victim's age, sex, or state of health. Further, if the mistreatment has 
occurred over a prolonged period of time, the Chamber would assess the severity of the 
treatment as a whole. Finally, this Chamber concurs with the finding of the Čelebići Trial 
Chamber, made specifically in the context of rape, that in certain circumstances the 
suffering can be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions and it should take into 
account the specific social, cultural and religious background of the victims when 
assessing the severity of the alleged conduct. 
 
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT–03–66-T, Judgement, para. 237 (Nov. 30, 2005). Likewise, 
consider this approach, which reasoned that the subjective element of an outrage 
 
must be tempered by objective factors; otherwise, unfairness to the accused would result 
because his/her culpability would depend not on the gravity of the act but wholly on the 
sensitivity of the victim. Consequently, an objective component to the actus reus is 
apposite: the humiliation to the victim must be so intense that the reasonable person 
would be outraged.  
 
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgment, para. 56 (June 25, 1999).   
 4. Torture and CIDT within the European Human Rights System. The earliest 
statements at the international level concerning the level of severity necessary for an act to 
constitute torture are from the European human rights system, with decisions from the European 
Commission of Human Rights (now defunct) and the European Court of Human Rights. Prior to 
the adoption of the Torture Convention, the European Commission of Human Rights in 1969 
concluded that the practice of falanga—severe beatings administered to all parts of the body—
constituted torture. The Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Eur. Comm'n of H.R.) 1, 186 
(1969). There, the European Commission distinguished torture from cruel treatment primarily on 
the basis of purpose and severity: ―torture is often used to describe inhuman treatment [that] has 
a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, 
and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment.‖ Id. at 168. For more background 
on this landmark case, see J. Becket, Barbarism in Greece 38–55 (1969) and J. Becket, The 
Greek Case Before the European Human Rights Commission, 1 Human Rights 91 (1970). A 
decade later, the European Commission and Court of Human Rights examined in detail the 
measure of severity required for an act to constitute torture in a case brought by Ireland against 
the United Kingdom. At issue were the following five interrogation techniques used by the 
British: 
 
(a)  wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some hours in a 
"stress position," described by those who underwent it as being "spread eagled 
against the wall, with their fingers put high above the head against the wall, the 
legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the 
weight of the body mainly on the fingers"; 
 
(b)  hooding: putting a black or navy coloured bag over the detainees' heads and, at 
least initially, keeping it there all the time except during interrogation; 
 
(c)  subjection to noise: pending their interrogations, holding the detainees in a room 
where there was a continuous loud and hissing noise; 
 
(d)  deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations, depriving the detainees of sleep; 
 
(e)  deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet during 
their stay at the centre and pending interrogations. 
 
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 96 (1976). While the European 
Commission of Human Rights found that these five techniques constituted torture, the European 
Court disagreed: 
 
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted to 
inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the extraction of confessions, 
the naming of others and/or information and although they were used systematically, they 
did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word 
torture as so understood. 
 
Id. at 167. The European Court found support for this approach at the international level from 
General Assembly Resolution 3452 (XXX)—a precursor to the Torture Convention—adopted 
unanimously by the members of the United Nations in 1975. Article 1(2) of that Resolution states 
that "Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment." In subsequent cases rendered after the promulgation of the Torture 
Convention, however, the European Court seemed to abandon its reliance on severity as the 
touchstone of torture. The Court subsequently found that the following acts constituted torture: 
being stripped naked and suspended by one's arms (Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 
(1996)); rape (Aydin v. Turkey, 1997–V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866 (1997)); and the following 
 
[The applicant] was detained over a period of three days during which she must have 
been bewildered and disorientated by being kept blindfolded, and in a constant state of 
physical pain and mental anguish brought on by the beatings administered to her during 
questioning and by the apprehension of what would happen to her next. She was also 
paraded naked in humiliating circumstances thus adding to her overall sense of 
vulnerability and on one occasion she was pummeled with high-pressure water while 
being spun around in a tire. 
 
Aydin v. Turkey, 1997–V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866, 1891. The European Court has embraced an 
evolutionary approach to its constitutive treaty. In Selmouni v. France, for example, the Court 
noted that the European Convention on Human Rights is a ―living instrument‖ such that ―certain 
acts which were classified in the past as ‗inhuman and degrading treatment‘ as opposed to 
‗torture‘ could be classified differently in the future.‖ Selmouni v. France, App. No. 258003/94, 
1999-V Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 155, para. 101. Is such an approach appropriate for international 
criminal law?   
5. "Stress and Duress" Techniques in Israel. Two decades after the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled on the Ireland Case, the Israeli Supreme Court evaluated a similar set of 
techniques used by the Israeli General Security Services (GSS). The techniques involved 
―forceful shaking of the suspect's upper torso, back and forth, repeatedly, in a manner which 
causes the neck and head to dangle and vacillate rapidly;‖ placing the suspect in the shabach 
position, which involves seating a hooded subject on a chair tipped forward with his hands tied 
behind him and subjecting him to loud music; the frog crouch; excessive tightening of handcuffs; 
and sleep deprivation. Both the U.N. Committee Against Torture and the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture had already concluded that the techniques were impermissible. The Israeli Supreme 
Court agreed that each of these techniques lacked legal authorization under existing law, 
although it did not call them ―torture.‖ With respect to the shabach position, for example, the 
Court ruled as follows:  
 
26. The "Shabach" method is composed of a number of cumulative components: 
the cuffing of the suspect, seating him on a low chair, covering his head with an opaque 
sack and playing powerfully loud music in the area. Are any of the above acts 
encompassed by the general power to investigate? Our point of departure is that there are 
actions which are inherent to the investigation power. Therefore, we accept that the 
suspect's cuffing, for the purpose of preserving the investigators' safety, is an action 
included in the general power to investigate. * * * Notwithstanding, the cuffing 
associated with the "Shabach" position is unlike routine cuffing. * * * One hand is placed 
inside the gap between the chair's seat and back support, while the other is tied behind 
him, against the chair's back support. This is a distorted and unnatural position. The 
investigators' safety does not require it. Therefore, there is no relevant justification for 
handcuffing the suspect's hands with particularly small handcuffs, if this is in fact the 
practice. The use of these methods is prohibited. * * * Moreover, there are other ways of 
preventing the suspect from fleeing from legal custody which do not involve causing the 
suspect pain and suffering. 
 27. * * * We accept that seating a man is inherent to the investigation. This is not 
the case when the chair upon which he is seated is a very low one, tilted forward facing 
the ground, and when he is sitting in this position for long hours. This sort of seating is 
not encompassed by the general power to interrogate. Even if we suppose that the seating 
of the suspect on a chair lower than that of his investigator can potentially serve a 
legitimate investigation objective (for instance, to establish the "rules of the game" in the 
contest of wills between the parties, or to emphasize the investigator's superiority over the 
suspect), there is no inherent investigative need for seating the suspect on a chair so low 
and tilted forward towards the ground, in a manner that causes him real pain and 
suffering. * * * All these methods do not fall within the sphere of a "fair" interrogation. 
They are not reasonable. They impinge upon the suspect's dignity, his bodily integrity and 
his basic rights in an excessive manner (or beyond what is necessary). * * *  
 28. We accept that there are interrogation related considerations concerned with 
preventing contact between the suspect under interrogation and other suspects and his 
investigators, which require means capable of preventing the said contact. The need to 
prevent contact may, for instance, flow from the need to safeguard the investigators' 
security, or that of the suspects and witnesses. It can also be part of the "mind game" 
which pins the information possessed by the suspect against that found in the hands of his 
investigators. For this purpose, the power to interrogate—in principle and according to 
the circumstances of each particular case—includes preventing eye contact with a given 
person or place. In the case at bar, this was the explanation provided by the State for 
covering the suspect's head with an opaque sack, while he is seated in the "Shabach" 
position. * * * All these methods are not inherent to an interrogation. They do not 
confirm the State's position, arguing that they are meant to prevent eye contact between 
the suspect being interrogated and other suspects. Indeed, even if such contact should be 
prevented, what is the purpose of causing the suspect to suffocate? Employing this 
method is not connected to the purpose of preventing the said contact and is consequently 
forbidden. Moreover, the statements clearly reveal that the suspect's head remains 
covered for several hours, throughout his wait. For these purposes, less harmful means 
must be employed, such as letting the suspect wait in a detention cell. * * * For it appears 
that at present, the suspect's head covering—which covers his entire head, rather than 
eyes alone—for a prolonged period of time, with no essential link to the goal of 
preventing contact between the suspects under investigation, is not part of a fair 
interrogation. It harms the suspect and his (human) image. It degrades him. It causes him 
to lose sight of time and place. It suffocates him. All these things are not included in the 
general authority to investigate. * * *  
 
See Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service's Interrogation Methods, 
38 I.L.M 1471 (1999). Excerpts from this opinion are reproduced in Chapter 15 on Defenses 
under International Criminal Law.  
 6. Torture's Effects. There is a sophisticated body of medical literature on the short- and 
long-term effects of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, both physical and psychological on 
victims. Less research exists on the impact of torture on torturers. A study of survivors of the five 
British techniques discussed above found that survivors experienced traumatic effects, including 
a state of psychosis, with long-lasting aftereffects. John Conroy, Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary 
People: The Dynamics of Torture 6 (2000); Stefan Priebe & Michael Bauer, Inclusion of 
Psychological Torture in PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] Criterion A, 152 American 
Journal of Psychiatry 1691-2 (1995). A report produced by 75 experts organized by the Human 
Rights Foundation of Turkey and Physicians for Human Rights listed the following physical and 
psychological effects of torture: 
 
Common somatic complaints include headache, back pain, gastrointestinal symptoms, 
sexual dysfunction, and muscle pain. Common psychological symptoms include 
depressive affect, anxiety, insomnia, nightmares, flashbacks, and memory difficulties. 
 
Istanbul Protocol, para. 170, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/8 (1999), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/8istprot.pdf. In a study of the effect of psychological torture by U.S. 
forces against detainees, Physicians for Human Rights listed the following possible impacts of 
psychological torture:  
 
memory impairment, reduced capacity to concentrate, somatic complaints such as 
headache and back pain, hyperarousal, avoidance, and irritability. Additionally, victims 
often experience severe depression with vegetative symptoms, nightmares, and 'feelings 
of shame and humiliation' associated with sexual violations, among others.  
 
Physicians for Human Rights, Break Them Down: Systematic Use of Psychological Torture by 
U.S. Forces (2005), available at 
http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/break-them-down-the.pdf. 
For an extensive discussion of the medical effects of torture, see the three part series by Ole V. 
Rasmussen et al., Medical, Physical Examination in Connection with Torture, in 14 Torture 
Journal 46 (2004) (Section 1); 15 Torture Journal 37 (2005) (Section 2); and 16 Torture Journal 
48 (2006) (Section 3). For a profound philosophical and cultural treatment of torture and pain 
that draws upon literature, art, documentation of torture from Amnesty International, and the 
writings of Clausewitz, Churchill, and Kissinger, see Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The 
Making and Unmaking of the World (1985). For a study of individuals who had been detained on 
Guantánamo, see Laurel E. Fletcher & Eric Stover, The Guantánamo Effect (2009).  
7. ―Torture Lite.” Interrogation techniques such as sleep deprivation, stress positions 
(so-called ―self-inflicted pain‖), isolation and sensory deprivation, temperature and dietary 
manipulation, noise bombardment, psychological humiliations (forced nudity, prevention of 
personal hygiene, forced grooming, denial of privacy, and infested surroundings), threats against 
self or family, attacks on cultural values or religious beliefs, and mock execution, have been 
described as ―torture lite,‖ because they do not at first consideration bear the hallmarks of 
brutality associated with ancient forms of torture—such as those described by Professor 
Langbein—or of today‘s notorious authoritarian regimes. These forms of abuse—which are often 
called ―clean‖ or ―stealth‖ torture—do not physically mutilate or maim the victim‘s body, leave 
permanent traces, require direct contact between the victim and the individual utilizing the 
particular technique, or cause pain immediately.  And yet, are such techniques truly less severe 
than the rack and screw of yesteryear? Detainees in U.S. custody have died as a result of these 
techniques: for example, one individual reportedly froze to death in a CIA ―black site‖ prison in 
Afghanistan, and another died after being beaten and then placed in a stress position in Abu 
Ghraib. How would the special characteristics of ―torture lite‖ alter the way in which victims, 
perpetrators, policy-makers, or the general public might interpret the legality, efficacy, and 
morality of these techniques?  Might the combined effects of such techniques be more disruptive 
and damaging than a short but brutal beating? A 2007 study of victims of torture compared the 
long-term psychological effects of ―torture lite‖ techniques and more physically violent torture. 
The authors conclude:  
 Ill treatment during captivity, such as psychological
 
manipulations, humiliating treatment, 
and forced stress positions,
 
does not seem to be substantially different from physical 
torture
 
in terms of the severity of mental suffering they cause, the
 
underlying mechanism 
of traumatic stress, and their long-term
 
psychological outcome. * * * These
 
findings 
suggest that physical pain per se is not the most important
 
determinant of traumatic stress 
in survivors of torture. * * * These findings [also] imply that various psychological 
manipulations,
 
ill treatment, and torture during interrogation share the same
 
psychological 
mechanism in exerting their traumatic impact.
 
All three types of acts are geared toward 
creating anxiety or fear
 
in the detainee while at the same time removing any form of
 
control from the person to create a state of total helplessness.
 
  
See Metin Başoğlu, Maria Livanou, & Cvetana Crnobarić, Torture vs Other Cruel, Inhuman, and 
Degrading Treatment: Is the Distinction Real or Apparent?, 64(3) Archives of General 
Psychiatry 277, 284 (2007), available at http://archpsyc.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/64/3/277. 
According to these researchers, what mattered most in terms of long-term effects were subjective 
factors, such as the victim‘s level of distress, feelings of helplessness, stressor interactions, and 
the perceived degree of uncontrollability of the situation. Indeed, declassified CIA-funded 
research from the 1950s and 1960s found that such techniques could be very effective at breaking 
prisoners. See Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation (1963), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB27/01-01.htm. Further research by Başoğlu, 
Head of Section of Trauma Studies at King's College London and the Istanbul Centre for 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, appears in the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry at 
http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=browsePA.volumes&jcode=ort. In this paper, he concludes 
on the basis of self-reporting by detainees in the former Yugoslavia and Turkey that acts of CIDT 
are ranked as more severe than acts of physical torture and are more often associated with Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Should the assessment of whether conduct constitutes torture 
or CIDT turn on whether the conduct causes long-term physical or psychological effects or is the 
degree of immediate suffering by a victim more relevant? On ―torture lite,‖ consider this 
perspective: 
 
[T]the use of terms like "torture lite" and the nature of such techniques encourage a moral 
psychology in which the violence and cruelty of torture is denied, the victim's suffering is 
hidden, minimized and doubted, and the torturer's responsibility is diminished. As such, 
the use of torture lite techniques is likely to encourage the normalization of torture. * * * 
The distinction between the methods referred to as torture lite and so-called real torture 
serves a further aim: it is sometimes used to distinguish not only between types of torture 
methods but also between the moral character of torturers and their motivations. 
According to this view, torturers who use such methods as beatings and mutilations are 
clearly brutal and sadistic, whereas those who use torture lite techniques can be portrayed 
as professionals motivated by the need to gain intelligence essential for saving lives. * * * 
By creating a false distinction between torture (understood as violent, brutal, and 
physically mutilating) and torture lite (with its connotations of minimal harm, minimal 
force, and minimal violence), those who authorize the use of torture and those who carry 
it out are able to portray their actions (to themselves and to observers) as something other 
than real torture, with all the negative connotations of that word. * * * Terms such as 
"torture lite" and "enhanced interrogation" neutralize the violence of these techniques and 
downplay the suffering they cause. Such euphemisms can also have a strong impact on 
how those using these terms (interrogators, public officials, and the general public) 
perceive the morality of the techniques thus described. 
 
Jessica Wolfendale, The Myth of “Torture Lite,” 23 Ethics and International Affairs 47 (2009), 
available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122275823/HTMLSTART.  
8. Incommunicado Detention. Might incommunicado detention, even in luxurious 
conditions, constitute torture, CIDT, or some other international crime?  How would you make 
such an argument within the framework of the Torture Convention or the ICC Statute?  
 
PROBLEM 
 
Prior to 2008, Nicaraguan law permitted ―therapeutic abortions‖ only for those women 
and girls whose life or health was threatened by the continuation of their pregnancy and, in some 
cases, for victims of rape. The revised penal code (which came into force in 2008), repealed this 
provision. See Law No. 164, Penal Code of the Republic of Nicaragua, available at 
http://www.poderjudicial.gob.ni/arc-pdf/CP_641.pdf. Nicaraguan law now completely prohibits 
abortion, regardless of the circumstances and even if the health of the woman has been raped, is 
the victim of incest, or is at risk from the continuation of the pregnancy. Abortion is also 
prohibited if the baby is unviable as in cases of anencephaly—a neural tube defect in which the 
fetus fails to develop a brain or skull vault and is born with dramatic physical defects. The 
condition is uniformly fatal; the baby is literally born dying and usually survives only a few days.  
A violation of this law can result in prison terms for both doctors and women or girls who 
carry out, or seek, an abortion (Article 143) and for doctors who cause unintentional harm to a 
fetus while administering medically necessary treatment to a pregnant women or girl (Articles 
145, 148, and 149). Article 143 provides: 
 
Whosoever causes an abortion with the consent of the woman shall be sanctioned with a 
penalty of one to three years in prison. If the person is a medical professional or health 
worker, the penalty will simultaneously include being prohibited from working in 
medicine or as a health worker for two to five years. The woman who intentionally causes 
her own abortion or agrees with someone else to provide an abortion will face a penalty 
of one to two years in prison. 
  
In a submission to the Committee Against Torture—the body charged with ensuring state 
compliance with the Convention Against Torture—Amnesty International argued that the penal 
legislation violated Nicaragua‘s obligations under the treaty. See Amnesty International, 
Nicaragua: The Impact of the Complete Ban of Abortion in Nicaragua: Briefing to the United 
Nations Committee Against Torture, Index No. AMR 43/005/2009 (April 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR43/005/2009/en. How would you make such an 
argument? If you were a lawyer within the Foreign Ministry of Nicaragua, how would you defend 
against such charges? Do such laws rise to the level of crimes against humanity?  
 
III. United States' Definitions of Torture 
 
 The United States has come under increasing scrutiny for certain interrogation practices 
undertaken at the U.S. military base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and other U.S. military detention 
centers throughout the world. While United States officials continually proclaim that the United 
States neither practices nor condones torture, evidence of the severe mistreatment of detainees 
has emerged. In addition, legal memoranda prepared by government lawyers have been made 
public that discuss when and how detainees may be interrogated using so-called ―enhanced 
interrogation techniques‖ (―EITs‖). In these memoranda, government lawyers offered a number 
of controversial interpretations of what constitutes torture under the international definition of the 
offense as well as the prohibition in U.S. law (18 U.S.C. § 2340). These memoranda have been 
posted on the website of the ACLU (www.aclu.org), which obtained them through the use of 
litigation, the Freedom of Information Act, and other advocacy, as well as here: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/policies-index.html. Government officials initially 
claimed that these memoranda were drafted in advance of the use of EITs; careful chronological 
research has revealed that some of these legal opinions were actually issued after particular 
techniques had already been employed.     
The memoranda take as their starting point the RUDS—reservations, understandings, and 
declarations—issued by the United States when it ratified the Convention Against Torture in 
1994 and the criminal prohibition against torture codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2340. See U.S. 
Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 
1990), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html. One reservation stated 
that ―the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16 to prevent ‗cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,‘ only insofar as the term ‗cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment‘ means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or 
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States.‖ An "understanding" stated that a form of specific intent is required for an 
act to constitute torture and set forth a closed list of forms of punishable mental torture: 
 
[W]ith reference to Article 1 [defining torture], the United States understands that, in 
order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical 
or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental 
harm caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of 
severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened 
administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated 
to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) 
the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain 
or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other 
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. 
 
Upon ratification, the U.S. defined torture in its penal code as follows:  
 
an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to 
lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). Severe mental pain or suffering is defined as: 
 
the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from 
 
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or 
suffering; 
 
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, 
of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly 
the senses of the personality; 
 
(C) the threat of imminent death; or 
 
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe 
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of a mind-altering 
substance or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or 
personality. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2340(2). In the wake of September 11, 2001, this statute was amended by the USA 
PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, Pub. L. 107-56) to penalize conspiracy to commit torture. 18 
U.S.C. §2340A(c). This crime of conspiracy is prosecuted only when it is committed ―outside the 
United States;‖ now defined as ―the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States.‖ In 2001, however, the 
USA PATRIOT Act expanded the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction (SMTJ) of the 
United States to include the premises of U.S. military or other government missions or entities in 
foreign states. This expansion of the SMTJ narrowed the reach of §2340, because it rendered 
certain overseas facilities within the SMTJ and thus no longer ―outside the United States.‖ This 
apparent anomaly was corrected by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 
which prospectively amended §2340 as set forth above to included only the states and territories 
of the U.S.  
An August 1, 2002 memorandum drafted by then Assistant Attorney General Jay S. 
Bybee (a former professor of law and now a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) to the 
then Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzalez, interpreted the definition of torture under §2340 
as follows: 
 
Specific Intent: ―To violate Section 2340A, the statute requires that severe pain 
and suffering must be inflicted with specific intent. In order for a defendant to have acted 
with specific intent, he must expressly intend to achieve the forbidden act. * * * As a 
result, the defendant had to act with the express ‗purpose to disobey the law‘ in order for 
the mens rea element to be satisfied. * * * [A] defendant [must] act with the specific 
intent to inflict severe pain, [and] the infliction of such pain must be the defendant's 
precise objective. * * * If the defendant acted knowing that severe pain or suffering was 
reasonably likely to result from his actions, but no more, he would have acted only with 
general intent. * * * As a theoretical matter, therefore, knowledge alone that a particular 
result is certain to occur does not constitute specific intent. * * * While as a theoretical 
matter such knowledge does not constitute specific intent, juries are permitted to infer 
from the factual circumstances that such intent is present. * * * [A] showing that an 
individual acted with a good faith belief that his conduct would not produce the result that 
the law prohibits negates specific intent. * * * Where a defendant acts in good faith, he 
acts with an honest belief that he has not engaged in the proscribed conduct. * * * A good 
faith belief need not be a reasonable one. * * * Where a defendant holds an unreasonable 
belief, he will confront the problem of proving to the jury that he actually held that 
belief.‖  
Severe Pain or Suffering: ―[To qualify as severe pain, an act must cause damage 
that rises to] the level that would ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious 
physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body 
functions.‖ 
Severe Mental Pain or Suffering: ―In order to prove ‗severe mental pain or 
suffering,‘ the statute requires proof of ‗prolonged mental harm.‘ * * * [T]he acts giving 
rise to the harm must cause some lasting, though not necessarily permanent, damage. For 
example, the mental strain experienced by an individual during a lengthy and intense 
interrogation—such as the one that state or local police might conduct upon a criminal 
suspect—would not meet this requirement. On the other hand, the development of a 
mental disorder such as post-traumatic stress disorder, which can last months or even 
years, or even chronic depression, which also can last for a considerable period of time if 
untreated, might satisfy the prolonged harm requirement.* * *  
 A defendant must specifically intend to cause prolonged mental harm for the 
defendant to have committed torture. It could be argued that a defendant needs to have 
specific intent only to commit the predicate acts that give rise to prolonged mental harm. 
Under that view, so long as the defendant specifically intended to, for example, threaten a 
victim with imminent death, he would have had sufficient mens rea for a conviction. 
According to this view, it would be further necessary for a conviction to show only that 
the victim factually suffered prolonged mental harm, rather than that the defendant 
intended to cause it. We believe that this approach is contrary to the text of the statute. 
The statute requires that the defendant specifically intend to inflict severe mental pain or 
suffering. Because the statute requires this mental state with respect to the infliction of 
severe mental pain, and because it expressly defines severe mental pain in terms of 
prolonged mental harm, that mental state must be present with respect to prolonged 
mental harm. * * * A defendant could negate a showing of specific intent to cause severe 
mental pain or suffering by showing that he had acted in good faith that his conduct 
would not amount to the acts prohibited by the statute. Thus if a defendant has a good 
faith belief that his actions will not result in prolonged mental harm, he lacks the mental 
state necessary for his action to constitute torture. Because the presence of good faith 
would negate the specific intent element of torture, it is a complete defense to such a 
charge. 
 
Dept. of Justice, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards 
of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) (citations removed).  
The August 2002 memo reflected the official U.S. policy on the definition of torture 
under U.S. law until it was leaked in the summer of 2004, the same summer during which 
reports, including photographs, of torture and other abuses by U.S. military personnel at the Iraqi 
prison, Abu Ghraib, were made public. The Bybee memo was "withdrawn" on June 22, 2004 and 
replaced in December 2004 by a Memorandum written by Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Daniel Levin to the then Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey. That memo re-interpreted 
the definition of torture in 18 U.S.C. § 2340 as follows: 
 
Severe: ―Although Congress defined ‗torture‘ * * * to require conduct specifically 
intended to cause ‗severe‘ pain or suffering, we do not believe Congress intended to reach 
only conduct involving ‗excruciating and agonizing‘ pain or suffering. * * * Drawing 
distinctions among gradations of pain (for example, severe, mild, moderate, substantial, 
extreme, intense, excruciating, or agonizing) is obviously not an easy task, especially 
given the lack of any precise, objective scientific criteria for measuring pain. * * * We 
conclude that under some circumstances ‗severe physical suffering‘ may constitute torture 
even if it does not involve ‗severe physical pain.‘ * * * To constitute ‗severe physical 
suffering‘ [as distinct from pain] would have to be a condition of some extended duration 
or persistence as well as intensity.‖ 
Severe Mental Pain or Suffering: ―[W]e do not believe that Congress intended the 
definition [of the crime] to create a presumption that any time one of the predicate acts 
occurs, prolonged mental harm is deemed to result. Turning to the question of what 
constitutes ‗prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from‘ a predicate act, we 
believe that Congress intended this phrase to require mental ‗harm‘ that is caused by or 
that results from a predicate act, and that has some lasting duration. * * * This damage 
need not be permanent, but it must continue for a ‗prolonged‘ period of time.‖ 
 Special Intent: ―[T]he [specific intent] cases are inconsistent. Some suggest that 
only a conscious desire to produce the proscribed result constitutes specific intent; others 
suggest that even reasonable foreseeability suffices. * * * In light of the President's 
directive that the United States not engage in torture, it would not be appropriate to rely 
on parsing the specific intent element of the statute to approve as lawful conduct that 
might otherwise amount to torture. Some observations, however, are appropriate. It is 
clear that the specific intent element would be met if a defendant performed an act and 
‗consciously desired‘ that act to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. 
Conversely, if an individual acted in good faith, and only after reasonable investigation 
establishing that his conduct would not inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, 
it appears unlikely that he would have the specific intent necessary to violate section 
2340. Such an individual could be said neither consciously to desire the proscribed result, 
nor to have ‗knowledge or notice‘ that his act ‗would likely have resulted in‘ the 
proscribed outcome.  
Two final points on the issue of specific intent. First, specific intent must be 
distinguished from motive. There is no exception under the statute permitting torture to 
be used for a ‗good reason.‘ Thus a defendant's motive (to protect national security, for 
example) is not relevant to the question whether he has acted with the requisite specific 
intent under the statute. Second, specific intent to take a given action can be found even if 
the defendant will take the action only conditionally. Thus, for example, the fact that a 
victim might have avoided being tortured by cooperating with the perpetrator would not 
make permissible actions otherwise constituting torture under the statute. Presumably that 
has frequently been the case with torture, but that fact does not make the practice of 
torture any less abhorrent or unlawful.‖ 
 
Dept. Of Justice, Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General re: Legal 
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) (citations removed).  
 
NOTES & QUESTIONS 
 
1. Comparing the Memos. Do you agree with either interpretation of § 2340? In what 
ways did the Levin memo alter the views contained within the Bybee memo? In what ways is it 
consistent with those views? In a footnote, Levin concludes that he has ―reviewed this Office‘s 
prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and [does] not believe that any 
of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this memorandum.‖ Id. at 
2, n.8. Do you agree?   
2. The United States’ Understanding. Several states formally objected to the United 
States‘ ―understanding‖ of the definition of torture. The Netherlands and Sweden, for example, 
declared that such an understanding should not affect the obligations of the United States under 
the treaty. The Netherlands stated the following: 
 
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers the [above-quoted] 
understanding to have no impact on the obligations of the United States of America 
under the Convention [as it] ... appears to restrict the scope of the definition of torture 
under Article 1 of the Convention. 
 
Do you agree with this assertion that the U.S.‘s ―understanding‖ improperly narrows the 
definition of torture? How?  
3. Specific Intent. In the Torture Convention, which element of the definition is modified 
by the terms ―intentionally inflicted‖? What arguments might a defendant make to avoid a 
finding of specific intent under the various formulations? What is the effect of Bybee and Levin 
formulations of specific intent? Would it constitute an act of torture if an individual did not 
intend to inflict severe pain or suffering but did in fact do so? What if the perpetrator knew there 
was a high likelihood that severe pain or suffering would result from her actions? Can a finding 
of specific intent be based on willful indifference, which exists where an actor is subjectively 
aware of the high probability of the fact in question? How might one prove this subjective state 
of mind? Would the fact that an individual, in good faith, thought his or her actions would not 
cause severe pain or suffering exonerate someone who did in fact cause serious suffering? How 
would an individual demonstrate that they were acting ―in good faith?‖ Could an interrogator 
consult a lawyer for a legal opinion on whether a particular act would cause severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental?   
 4. Additional Memoranda. Upon taking office in 2009, President Barack Obama 
declassified additional ―torture memos‖ (containing varying degrees of redaction). Further 
memos were released as a result of litigation. Consider the following excerpt from a May 10, 
2005 memorandum written by Stephen G. Bradbury, then a Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
for the Office of Legal Council (OLC) of the Department of Justice. The OLC provides legal 
advice to the Executive Branch under the leadership of an Assistant Attorney General (see 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/).  
 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Legal Counsel 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A. RIZZO 
SENIOR DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
 
Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques 
That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee 
 
 You have asked us to address whether certain specified interrogation techniques designed 
to be used on a high value al Qaeda detainee in the War on Terror comply with the federal 
prohibition on torture, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. * * * Because you have asked us to 
address the application of sections 2340-2340A to specific interrogation techniques, the present 
memorandum necessarily includes discussion of the applicable legal standards and their 
application to particular facts. * * *  
 Torture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to international norms. The 
universal repudiation of torture is reflected not only in our criminal law, see e.g. 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2340-2340A, but also in international agreements, in centuries of Anglo-American law, and in 
the longstanding policy of the United States, repeatedly and recently reaffirmed by the President. 
Consistent with these norms, the President has directed unequivocally that the United States is 
not to engage in torture.  
 The task of interpreting and applying sections 2340-2340A is complicated by the lack of 
precision in the statutory terms and the lack of relevant case law. In defining the federal crime of 
torture, Congress required that the defendant ―specifically intend” to inflict ―severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering,‖ and Congress narrowly defined ―severe mental pain or suffering‖ to 
mean ―the prolonged mental harm caused by‖ enumerated predicate acts, including ―the threat of 
imminent death‖ and ―procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.‖ 18 
U.S.C. § 2340 (emphases added). These statutory requirements are consistent with U.S. 
obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Torture [―CAT‖], the treaty that 
obligates the United States to ensure that torture is a crime under U.S. law and that is 
implemented by sections 2340-2340A. The requirements in sections 2340-2340A closely track 
the understandings and reservations required by the Senate when it gave its advice and consent to 
ratification of the Convention Against Torture. They reflect a clear intent by Congress to limit the 
scope of the prohibition on torture under U.S. law. However, many of the key terms used in the 
statute (for example, ―severe,‖ ―prolonged,‖ ―suffering‖) are imprecise and necessarily bring a 
degree of uncertainty to addressing the reach of sections 2340-2340A. Moreover, relevant 
judicial guidance, coupled with the President‘s clear directive that the United States does not 
condone or engage in torture, counsel great care in applying the stature to specific conduct. We 
have attempted to exercise such care throughout this memorandum.  
 With these considerations in mind, we turn to the particular question before us: whether 
certain specified interrogation techniques may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(―CIA‖) on a high value al Qaeda detainee consistent with the federal statutory prohibition on 
torture, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.
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 For the reasons discussed below, and based on the 
representations we have received from you (or officials of your Agency) about the particular 
techniques in question, the circumstances in which they are authorized for use, and the physical 
and psychological assessments made of the detainee to be interrogated, we conclude that the 
separate authorized use of each of the specific techniques at issue, subject to the limitations and 
safeguards described herein, would not violate sections 2340-2340A. Our conclusion is 
straightforward with respect to all but two of the techniques discussed herein. As discussed 
below, use of sleep deprivation as an enhanced technique and use of the waterboard involve more 
substantial questions, with the waterboard presenting the most substantial question. * * * 
  
I. 
 
In asking us to consider certain specific techniques to be used in the interrogation of a 
particular al Qaeda operative, you have provided background information common to the use of 
all of the techniques. You have advised that these techniques would be used only on an 
individual who is determined to be a ―High Value Detainee,‖ defined as: 
 
a detainee who, until time of capture, we have reason to believe: (1) is a senior member of 
al-Qai‘da or an al-Qai‘da associated terrorist group (Jemaah Islamiyyah, Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad, al-Zarqawi Group, etc.); (2) has knowledge of imminent terrorist threats against the 
USA, its military forces, its citizens and organizations, or its allies; or that has/had direct 
involvement in planning and preparing terrorist actions against the USA or its allies, or 
assisting the al-Qai‘da leadership in planning and preparing such terrorist actions; and (3) 
if released, constitutes a clear and continuing threat to the USA or its allies.  
 
Fax for Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant General, Office of Legal Counsel, from asdkhaiofnifowe 
Assistant General Counsel, CIA, at 3 (Jan. 4, 2005) (“January 4 asdk Fax”). * * *  
 You have also explained that, prior to interrogations, each detainee is evaluated by 
medical and psychological professionals from the CIA‘s Office of Medical Services (―OMS‖) to 
ensure that he is not likely to suffer any severe physical or mental pain or suffering as a result of 
interrogation.  
 
[T]echnique-specific advanced approval is required for all ―enhanced‖ measures and is 
conditional on on-site medical and psychological personnel confirming from direct 
detainee examination that the enhanced technique(s) is not expected to produce ―severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering.‖ As a practical matter, the detainee‘s physical 
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 We have previously advised you that the use by the CIA of the techniques of interrogation discussed herein is 
consistent with the Constitution and applicable statutes and treaties. In the present memorandum, you have asked us 
to address only the requirements of 18 U.S.C §§ 2340-2340A. Nothing in this memorandum or in our prior advice to 
the CIA should be read to suggest that the use of these techniques would conform to the requirements of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice that governs members of the Armed Forces or to United States obligations under the Geneva 
Conventions in circumstances in which those Conventions would apply. We do not address the possible application 
of article 16 of the CAT [prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment], nor do we address any 
question relating to conditions of confinement or detention, as distinct from the interrogation of detainees. * * *  
condition must be such that these interventions will not have lasting effect, and his 
psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm will result.  
 
OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, Interrogation 
and Detention at 9 (Dec. 2004) (“OMS Guidelines”). * * * In addition, ―subsequent medical 
rechecks during the interrogation period should be performed on a regular basis.‖ Id. As an 
additional precaution, and to ensure the objectivity of their medical and psychological 
assessments, OMS personnel do not participate in administering interrogation techniques; their 
function is to monitor interrogations and the health of the detainee. * * * 
 We understand that, when approved, interrogation techniques are generally used in an 
escalating fashion, with milder techniques used first. Use of the techniques is not continuous. 
Rather, one or more techniques may be applied—during or between interrogation sessions—
based on the judgment of the interrogators and other team members and subject always to the 
monitoring of the on-scene medical and psychological personnel. Use of the techniques may be 
continued if the detainee is still believed to have and to be withholding actionable intelligence. 
The use of these techniques may not be continued for more than 30 days without additional 
approval from CIA Headquarters. See generally George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, 
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the asdkhaiofnifoweqiofpiefniqwefowie at 
1-2 (Jan 28, 2003) (describing approval procedures required for use of enhanced interrogation 
techniques). Moreover, even within that 30-day period, any further use of these interrogation 
techniques is discontinued if the detainee is judged to be consistently providing accurate 
intelligence or if he is no longer believed to have actionable intelligence. This memorandum 
addresses the use of these techniques during no more than one 30-day period. We do not address 
whether the use of these techniques beyond the initial 30-day period would violate the statute.  
 Medical and psychological personnel are on-scene throughout (and, as detailed below, 
physically present or otherwise observing during the application of many techniques, including 
all techniques involving physical contact with detainees), and ―[d]aily physical and psychological 
evaluations are continued throughout the period of [enhanced interrogation technique] use.‖ CIA 
Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-
October 2003), No. 2003-7123-IG (May 7, 2004) 30 n. 35 (―IG Report‖). * * * In addition, ―[i]n 
each interrogation session in which an Enhanced Technique is employed, a contemporaneous 
record shall be created setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed.‖ 
Interrogation Guidelines at 3. At any time, any on-scene personnel (including the medical or 
psychological personnel, the chief of base, substantive experts, security officers, and other 
interrogators) can intervene to stop the use of any technique if it appears that the technique is 
being used improperly, and on-scene medical personnel can intervene if the detainee has 
developed a condition making the use of the technique unsafe. More generally, medical 
personnel watch for signs of physical distress or mental harm so significant as possibly to amount 
to the ―severe physical or mental pain or suffering‖ that is prohibited by sections 2340-2340A. * 
* *  
 These techniques have all been imported from military Survival, Evasion, Resistance, 
Escape (―SERE‖) training, where they have been used for years on U.S. military personnel, 
although with some significant differences described below. See IG Report at 13-14. Although 
we refer to the SERE experience below, we note at the outset an important limitation on reliance 
on that experience. Individuals undergoing SERE training are obviously in a very different 
situation from detainees undergoing interrogation; SERE trainees know it is part of a training 
program, not a real-life interrogation regime, they presumably know it will last only a short time, 
and they presumably have assurance that they will not be significantly harmed by the training.  
 You have described the specific techniques at issue as follows: 
1. Dietary manipulation. This technique involved the substitution of commercial liquid 
meal replacements for normal food, presenting detainees with a bland, unappetizing, but 
nutritionally complete diet. You have informed us that the CIA believes dietary manipulation 
makes other techniques, such as sleep deprivation, more effective. * * * Calories are provided 
using commercial liquid diets (such as Ensure Plus), which also supply other essential nutrients 
and make for nutritionally complete meals.
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 * * *  
2. Nudity. This technique is used to cause psychological discomfort, particularly if a 
detainee, for cultural or other reasons, is especially modest. When the technique is employed, 
clothing can be provided as an instant reward for cooperation. During and between interrogation 
sessions, a detainee maybe kept nude, provided that ambient temperatures and the health of the 
detainee permit. For this technique to be employed, ambient temperature must be at least 68°F.
 
No sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse are permitted. Although each detention cell has full-
time closed circuit video monitoring, the detainee is not intentionally exposed to other detainees 
or unduly exposed to the detention facility staff. We understand that interrogators ―are trained to 
avoid sexual innuendo or any acts of implicit or explicit sexual degradation.‖ Letter from 
asdkhaiofni Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 
OLC (October 12, 2004) at 2 (―October 12 asd Letter‖). Nevertheless, interrogators can exploit 
the detainee‘s fear of being seen naked. In addition, female officers involved in the interrogation 
may see the detainees naked; and for purposes of our analysis, we will assume that detainees 
subjected to nudity as an interrogation technique are aware that they may be seen naked by 
females. * * *  
4. Walling. This technique involves the use of a flexible, false wall. The individual is 
placed with his heels touching the flexible wall. The interrogator pulls the individual forward and 
then quickly and firmly pushes the individual into the wall. It is the individual‘s shoulder blades 
that hit the wall. During this motion, the head and neck are supported with a rolled hood or towel 
that provides a C-collar effect to help prevent whiplash. To reduce further the risk of injury, the 
individual is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall. You have informed us that the false wall 
is also constructed to create a loud noise when the individual hits it in order to increase the shock 
or surprise of the technique. We understand that walling may be used when the detainee is 
uncooperative or unresponsive to questions from interrogators. Depending on the extent of the 
detainee‘s lack of cooperation, he may be walled one time during an interrogation session (one 
impact with the wall) or many times (perhaps 20 or 30 times) consecutively. We understand that 
this technique is not designed to, and does not, cause severe pain, even when used repeatedly as 
you have described. Rather, it is designed to wear down the detainee and to shock or surprise the 
detainee and alter his expectations about the treatment he believes he will receive. In particular, 
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 While detainees subject to dietary manipulation are obviously situated differently from individuals who voluntarily 
engage in commercial weight-loss programs, we note that widely available commercial weight-loss programs in the 
United States employ diets of 1000 kcal/day for sustained periods of weeks or longer without requiring medical 
supervision. While we do not equate commercial weight loss programs and this interrogation technique, the fact that 
these calorie levels are used in the weight-loss programs, in our view, is instructive in evaluating the medical safety 
of the interrogation technique.  
we specifically understand that the repetitive use of the walling technique is intended to 
contribute to the shock and drama of the experience, to dispel a detainee‘s expectations that 
interrogators will not use increasing levels of force, and to wear down his resistance. It is not 
intended to—and based on experience you have informed us that it does not—inflict any injury 
or cause severe pain. Medical and psychological personnel are physically present or otherwise 
observing whenever this technique is applied (as they are with any interrogation technique 
involving physical contact with the detainee). * * *  
6. Facial slap or insult slap. With this technique, the interrogator slaps the individual‘s 
face with fingers slightly spread. The hand makes contact with the area directly between the tip 
of the individual‘s chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe. The interrogator thus 
―invades‖ the individual‘s ―personal space.‖ We understand that the goal of the facial slap is not 
to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting. Instead, the purpose of the facial slap is to induce 
shock, surprise, or humiliation. Medical and psychological personnel are physically present or 
otherwise observing whenever this technique is applied. * * *  
8. Cramped confinement. This technique involves placing the individual in a confined 
space, the dimensions of which restrict the individual‘s movement. The confined space is usually 
dark. The duration of confinement varies based upon the size of the container. For the larger 
confined space, the individual can stand up or sit down; the smaller space is large enough for the 
subject to sit down. Confinement in the larger space may last no more than 8 hours at a time for 
no more than 18 hours a day; for the smaller space, confinement may last no more than two 
hours.
13
 * * *  
10. Stress positions. There are three stress positions that may be used. You have informed 
us that these positions are not designed to produce the pain associated with contortions or 
twisting of the body. Rather, like wall standing, they are designed to produce the physical 
discomfort associated with temporary muscle fatigue. The three stress positions are (1) sitting on 
the floor with legs extended straight out in front and arms raised above the head, (2) kneeling on 
the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle, and (3) leaning against a wall generally about 
three feet away from the detainee‘s feet, with only the detainee‘s head touching the wall, while 
his wrists are handcuffed in front of him or behind his back, and while an interrogator stands next 
to him to prevent injury if he loses his balance. As with wall standing, we understand that these 
positions are used only to induce temporary muscle fatigue.  
11. Water dousing.  Cold water is poured on the detainee either from a container or from 
a hose without a nozzle. This technique is intended to weaken the detainee‘s resistance and 
persuade him to cooperate with interrogators. The water poured on his head must be potable, and 
the interrogators must ensure that water does not enter the detainee‘s nose, mouth, or eyes. A 
medical officer must observe and monitor the detainee throughout application of this technique, 
including for signs of hypothermia. Ambient temperatures must remain about 64°F. If the 
detainee is lying on the floor, his head is to remain vertical, and a poncho, mat, or other material 
must be placed between him and the floor to minimize the loss of body heat. At the conclusion of 
the water dousing session, the detainee must be moved to a heated room if necessary to permit 
his body temperature to return to normal in a safe manner. To ensure an adequate margin of 
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 In Interrogation Memorandum, we also addressed the use of harmless insects placed in a confinement box and 
concluded that it did not violate the statute. We understand that—for reasons unrelated to any concern that it might 
violate the statute—the CIA never used that technique and has removed it from the list of authorized interrogation 
techniques; accordingly, we do not address it again here.  
safety, the maximum period of time at which, based on extensive medical literature and 
experience, hypothermia could be expected to develop in healthy individuals who are submerged 
in water of the same temperature. * * *  
 The minimum permissible temperature of the water used in water dousing is 41°F, though 
you have informed us that in practice the water temperature is generally not below 50°F, since 
tap water rather than refrigerated water is generally used. We understand that a version of water 
dousing routinely used in SERE training is much more extreme in that it involved complete 
immersion of the individual in cold water (where water temperatures may be below 40°F) and is 
usually performed outdoors where ambient air temperatures may be as low as 10°F. Thus, the 
SERE training version involves a far greater impact on body temperature, SERE training also 
involves a situation where the water may enter the trainee‘s nose and mouth. * * *  
  12. Sleep deprivation (more than 48 hours). This technique subjects a detainee to an 
extended period without sleep. You have informed us that the primary purpose of this technique 
is to weaken the subject and wear down his resistance.  
 The primary method of sleep deprivation involves the use of shackling to keep the 
detainee awake. In this method, the detainee is standing and is handcuffed, and the handcuffs are 
attached by a length of chain to the ceiling. The detainee‘s hands are shackled in front of his 
body, so that the detainee has approximately a two to three foot diameter of movement. The 
detainee‘s feet are shackled to a bolt in the floor. Due care is taken to ensure that the shackles are 
neither too loose nor too tight for physical safety. We understand from discussions with OMS 
that the shackling does not result in any significant physical pain for the subject. The detainee‘s 
hands are generally between the level of his heart and his chin. In some cases, the detainee‘s 
hands may be raised above the level of his head, but only for a period of up to two hours. All of 
the detainee‘s weight is borne by his legs and feet during standing sleep deprivation. You have 
informed us that the detainee is not allowed to hang from or support his body weight with the 
shackles. Rather, we understand that the shackles are only used as a passive means to keep the 
detainee standing and thus to prevent him from falling asleep; should the detainee begin to fall 
asleep, he will lose his balance and awaken, either because of the sensation of losing his balance 
or because of the restraining tension of the shackles. The use of this passive means for keeping 
the detainee awake avoids the need for using means that would require interaction with the 
detainee and might pose a danger of physical harm. 
 We understand from you that no detainee subjected to this technique by the CIA has 
suffered any harm or injury, either by falling down and forcing the handcuffs to bear his weight 
or in any other way. You have assured us that detainees are continuously monitored by closed-
circuit television, so that if a detainee were unable to stand, he would immediately be removed 
from the standing position and would not be permitted to dangle by his wrists. We understand 
that standing sleep deprivation may cause edema, or swelling, in the lower extremities because it 
forces detainees to stand for an extended period of time, OMS has advised us that this condition 
is not painful, and that the condition disappears quickly once the detainee is permitted to lie 
down. * * *  
 We understand that a detainee undergoing sleep deprivation is generally fed by hand by 
CIA personnel so that he need not be unshackled; however, ―if progress is made during 
interrogation, the interrogators may unshackle the detainee and let him feed himself as a positive 
incentive.‖ October 12 asd Letter at 4. If the detainee is clothed, he wears an adult diaper under 
his pants. Detainees subject to sleep deprivation who are also subject to nudity as a separate 
interrogation technique will at times be nude and wearing a diaper. If the detainee is wearing a 
diaper, it is checked regularly and changed as necessary. The use of the diaper is for sanitary and 
health purposes of the detainee; it is not used for the purpose of humiliating the detainee, and it is 
not considered to be an interrogation technique. The detainee‘s skin condition is monitored, and 
diapers are changed as needed so that the detainee does not remain in a soiled diaper. You have 
informed us that to date no detainee has experienced any skin problems resulting from use of 
diapers. 
 The maximum allowable duration for sleep deprivation authorized by the CIA is 180 
hours, after which the detainee must be permitted to sleep without interruption for at least eight 
hours. You have informed us that to date, more than a dozen detainees have been subjected to 
sleep deprivation of more than 48 hours, and three detainees have been subjected to sleep 
deprivation of more than 96 hours; the longest period of time for which any detainee has been 
deprived of sleep by the CIA is 180 hours. * * *  
 13. The “waterboard.” In this technique, the detainee is lying on a gurney that is inclined 
at an angle of 10 to 15 degrees to the horizontal, with the detainee on his back and his head 
toward the lower end of the gurney. A cloth is placed over the detainee‘s face, and cold water is 
poured on the cloth from a height of approximately 6 to 18 inches. The wet cloth creates a barrier 
through which it is difficult—or in some cases not possible—to breathe. A single ―application‖ 
of water may not last for more than 40 seconds, with the duration of an ―application‖ measured 
from the moment when water—of whatever quantity—is first poured on to the cloth until the 
moment the cloth is removed from the subject‘s face. See Letter from asdkhaiofni Associate 
General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, OLC (August 19, 2004) 
at 1 (―August 19 asd Letter‖). When the time limit is reached, the pouring of water is 
immediately discontinued and the cloth is removed. We understand that if the detainee makes an 
effort to defeat the technique (e.g., by twisting his head to the side and breathing out of the comer 
of his mouth), the interrogator may cup his hands around the detainee‘s nose and mouth to dam 
the runoff, in which case it would not be possible for the detainee to breathe during the 
application of the water. In addition, you have informed us that the technique may be applied in a 
manner to defeat efforts by the detainee to hold his breath by, for example, beginning an 
application of water as the detainee is exhaling. Either in the normal application, or where 
countermeasures are used, we understand that water may enter and may accumulate in the 
detainee‘s mouth and nasal cavity, preventing him from breathing. * * *  
 We understand that the effect of the waterboard is to induce a sensation of drowning. 
This sensation is based on a deeply rooted physiological response. Thus, the detainee experiences 
this sensation even if he is aware that he is not actually drowning. We are informed that based on 
extensive experience the process is not physically painful but that it usually does cause fear and 
panic. The waterboard has been used many thousands of times in SERE training provided to 
American military personnel, though in that context it is usually limited to one or two 
applications of no more than 40 seconds each.  
 You have explained that the waterboard technique is used only if: (1) the CIA has 
credible intelligence that a terrorist attack is imminent; (2) there are ―substantial and credible 
indicators the subject has actionable intelligence that can prevent, disrupt or delay this attack‖; 
and (3) other interrogation methods have failed or are unlikely to yield actionable intelligence in 
time to prevent the attack. You have also informed us that the waterboard may be approved for 
use with a given detainee only during, at most, one single 30-day period, and that during that 
period, the waterboard technique may be used on no more than five days. We further understand 
that in any 24 hour period, interrogators may use no more than two ―sessions‖ of the waterboard 
on a subject—with a ―session‖ defined to mean the time that the detainee is strapped to the 
waterboard—and that no session may last more than two hours. Moreover, during any session, 
the number of individual applications of water lasting 10 seconds or longer may not exceed six. 
As noted above, the maximum length of any application of water is 40 seconds (you have 
informed us that this maximum has rarely been reached). Finally, the total cumulative time of all 
applications of whatever length in a 24 hour period may not exceed 12 minutes. * * *  
Your medical personnel have explained that the use of the waterboard does pose a small 
risk of certain potentially significant medical problems and that certain measures are taken to 
avoid or address such problems. First, a detainee might vomit and then aspirate the emesis 
[vomit]. To reduce this risk, any detainee on whom this technique will be used is first placed on a 
liquid diet. Second, the detainee might aspirate some of the water, and the resulting water in the 
lungs might lead to pneumonia. To mitigate this risk, a potable saline solution is used in the 
procedure. Third, it is conceivable (though, we understand from OMS, highly unlikely) that a 
detainee could suffer spasms of the larynx that would prevent him from breathing even when the 
application of water is stopped and the detainee is returned to an upright position. In the event of 
such spasms, a qualified physician would immediately intervene to address the problem, and, if 
necessary, the intervening physician would perform a tracheotomy. * * *  
 As noted, all of the interrogation techniques described above are subject to numerous 
restrictions, many based on input from OMS. Our advice in this memorandum is based on our 
understanding that there will be careful adherence to all of these guidelines, restrictions, and  
safeguards, and that there will be ongoing monitoring and reporting by the team, including OMS 
medical and psychological personnel, as well as prompt intervention by a team member, as 
necessary, to prevent physical distress or mental harm so significant as possibly to amount to the 
―severe physical or mental pain or suffering‖ that is prohibited by sections 2340-2340A. Our 
advice is also based on our understanding that interrogators who will use these techniques are 
adequately trained to understand that the authorized use of the techniques is not designed or 
intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering, and also to understand and respect 
the medical judgment of OMS and the important role that OMS personnel play in the program.  
* * *  
III. 
 
 In the discussion that follows, we will address each of the specific interrogation 
techniques you have described. Subject to the understandings, limitations, and safeguards 
discussed herein, including ongoing medical and psychological monitoring and team intervention 
as necessary, we conclude that the authorized use of each of these techniques, considered 
individually, would not violate the prohibition that Congress has adopted in sections 2340-
2340A. This conclusion is straightforward with respect to all but two of the techniques. Use of 
sleep deprivation as an enhanced technique and use of the waterboard, however, involve more 
substantial questions, with the waterboard presenting the most substantial question. Although we 
conclude that the use of these techniques—as we understand them and subject to the limitations 
you have described—would not violate the statute, the issues raised by these two techniques 
counsel great caution in their use, including both careful adherence to the limitations and 
restrictions you have described and also close and continuing medical and psychological 
monitoring. * * *  
 1. Dietary manipulation. Based on experience, it is evident that this technique is not 
expected to cause any physical pain, let alone pain that is extreme in intensity. * * * Nor could 
this technique reasonably be thought to induce ―severe physical suffering.‖ Although dietary 
manipulation may cause some degree of hunger, such an experience is far from extreme hunger 
(let alone starvation) and cannot be expected to amount to ―severe physical suffering‖ under the 
statute. * * * This technique presents no issue of ―severe mental pain or suffering‖ within the 
meaning of sections 2340-2340A, because the use of this technique would involve no qualifying 
predicate act. * * *  
 2. Nudity. * * * Even if this technique involves some physical discomfort, it cannot be 
said to cause ―suffering‖, let alone ―severe physical pain or suffering,‖ and we therefore conclude 
that its authorized use by an adequately trained interrogator could not reasonably be considered 
specifically intended to do so. Although some detainees might be humiliated by this technique, 
especially given possible cultural sensitivities and the possibility of being seen by female 
officers, it cannot constitute ―severe mental pain or suffering‖ under the statute because it does 
not involve any of the predicate acts specified by Congress. * * *  
 4. Walling. Although the walling technique involves the use of considerable force to push 
the detainee against the wall and may involve a large number of repetitions in certain cases, we 
understand that the false wall that is used is flexible and that this technique is not designed to, 
and does not, cause severe physical pain to the detainee. We understand that there may be some 
pain or irritation associated with the collar, which is used to help avoid injury such as whiplash to 
the detainee, but that any physical pain associated with the use of the collar would not approach 
the level of intensity needed to constitute severe physical pain. * * * We also do not believe that 
the use of this technique would involve a threat of infliction of severe physical pain or suffering 
or other predicate act for purposes of severe mental pain or suffering under the statute. Rather, 
this technique is designed to shock the detainee and disrupt his expectations that he will not be 
treated forcefully and to wear down his resistance to interrogation. Based on these 
understandings, we conclude that the authorized use of this technique by adequately trained 
interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering in violation of sections 2340-2340A.
38
 * * *  
 6. Facial slap or insult slap. Although this technique involves a degree of physical pain, 
the pain associated with a slap to the face, as you have described it to us, could not be expected 
to constitute severe physical pain. We understand that the purpose of this technique is to cause 
shock, surprise, or humiliation not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting; we assume it 
will be used accordingly. * * * Therefore, the authorized use of this technique by adequately 
trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause severe 
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 In Interrogation Memorandum, we did not describe the walling technique as involving the number of repetitions 
that we understand may be applied. Our advice with respect to walling in the present memorandum is specifically 
based on the understanding that the repetitive use of walling is intended only to increase the drama and shock of the 
technique, to wear down the detainee‘s resistance, and to disrupt expectations that he will not be treated with force, 
and that such use is not intended to, and does not in fact, cause severe physical pain to the detainee. Moreover, our 
advice specifically assumes that the use of walling will be stopped if there is any indication that the use of the 
technique is or may be causing severe physical pain to a detainee.  
physical or mental pain or suffering in violation of sections 2340-2340A.
39
 * * *  
 8. Cramped confinement. This technique does not involve any significant physical pain or 
suffering. It also does not involve a predicate act for purposes of severe mental pain or suffering. 
Specifically, we do not believe that placing a detainee in a dark, cramped space for the limited 
period of time involved here could reasonably be considered a procedure calculated to disrupt 
profoundly the senses so as to cause prolonged mental harm. Accordingly, we conclude that it‘s 
authorized use by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered 
specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering in violation of sections 
2340-2340A. * * * 
40 
* * *  
 11. Water dousing. OMS has advised that, based on the extensive experience in SERE 
training, the medical literature, and the experience with detainees to date, water dousing as 
authorized is not designed or expected to cause significant physical pain, and certainly not severe 
physical pain. Although we understand that prolonged immersion in very cold water may be 
physically painful, as noted above, this interrogation technique does not involve immersion and a 
substantial margin of safety is built into the time limitation on the use of the CIA‘s water dousing 
technique—use of the technique with water of a given temperature must be limited to no more 
than two-thirds of the time in which hypothermia could be expected to occur from total 
immersion in water of the same temperature. * * *  
 12. Sleep deprivation. We understand from OMS, and from our review of the literature on 
the physiology of sleep, that even very extended sleep deprivation does not cause physical pain, 
let alone severe physical pain.
44
 * * * Although it is a more substantial question, particularly 
given the imprecision in the statutory standard and the lack of guidance from the courts, we also 
conclude that extended sleep deprivation, subject to the limitations and conditions described 
herein, would not be expected to cause ―severe physical suffering.‖ * * * Nevertheless, because 
extended sleep deprivation could in some cases result in substantial physical distress, the 
safeguards adopted by the CIA, including ongoing medical monitoring and intervention by the 
team if needed, are important to ensure that the CIA‘s use of extended sleep deprivation will not 
run afoul of the statute. * * * Moreover, we emphasize our understanding that OMS will 
intervene to alter or stop the course of sleep deprivation for a detainee if OMS concludes in its 
medical judgment that the detainee is or may be experiencing extreme physical distress. The 
team, we understand, will intervene not only if the sleep deprivation itself may be having such 
effects, but also if the shackling or other conditions attendant to the technique appear to be 
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 Our advice about both the facial slap and the abdominal slap assumes that the interrogators will apply those 
techniques as designed and will not strike the detainee with excessive force or repetition in a manner that might 
result in severe physical pain.  
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 A stress position that involves such contortion or twisting, as well as one held for so long that it could not be 
aimed only at producing temporary muscle fatigue, might raise more substantial questions under the statute. Cf. Army 
Field Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation  at 1-8 (1992) (indicating that ―[f]orcing an individual to stand, sit, 
or kneel in abnormal positions for prolonged periods of time‖ may constitute ―torture‖ within the meaning of the 
Third Geneva Convention‘s requirement that ―[n]o physical or mental torture, not any other form of coercion, may 
be inflicted on prisoners of war,‖ but not addressing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A); United Nations General Assembly, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
U.N. Doc. A/59/150 at 6 (Sept. 1, 2004) (suggesting that ―holding detainees in painful and/or stressful positions‖ 
might in certain circumstances be characterized as torture). 
44
 Although sleep deprivation is not itself physically painful, we understand that some studies have noted that 
extended total sleep deprivation may have the effect of reducing tolerance to some forms of pain in some subjects. * 
* *  
causing severe physical suffering. * * *  
Finally, we also conclude that extended sleep deprivation cannot be expected to cause 
―severe mental pain or suffering‖ as defined in sections 2340-2340A, and that its authorized use 
by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to do 
so. First, we do not believe that use of the sleep deprivation technique, subject to the conditions 
in place, would involve one of the predicate acts necessary for ―severe mental pain or suffering‖ 
under the statute. * * * It may be questioned whether sleep deprivation could be characterized as 
a ―procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality‖ within the meaning of 
sections 2340(2)(B), since we understand from OMS and from the scientific literature that 
extended sleep deprivation might induce hallucinations in some cases. * * * Even assuming, 
however, that the extended use of sleep deprivation may result in hallucinations that could fairly 
be characterized as a ―profound‖ disruption of the senses, we do not believe it tenable to 
conclude that in such circumstances the use of sleep deprivation could be said to be ―calculated‖ 
to cause such profound disruption to the senses, as required by the statute. The term ―calculated‖ 
denotes something that is planned or thought out beforehand. * * * Here, it is evident that the 
potential for any hallucinations on the part of a detainee undergoing sleep deprivation is not 
something that would be a ―calculated‖ result of the use of this technique, particularly given that 
the team would intervene immediately to stop the technique if there were signs the subject was 
experiencing hallucinations.  
 Second, even if we were to assume, out of an abundance of caution, that extended sleep 
deprivation could be said to be a ―procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or 
personality‖ of the subject within the meaning of sections 2340(2)(B), we do not believe that this 
technique would be expected to—or that its authorized use by adequately trained interrogators 
could reasonably be considered specifically intended to—cause ―prolonged mental harm‖ as 
required by the statute, because, as we understand it, any hallucinatory effects of sleep 
deprivation would dissipate rapidly. * * *  
 13. Waterboard. We previously concluded that the use of the waterboard did not 
constitute torture under sections 2340-2340A. We must reexamine the issue, however, because 
the technique, as it would be used, could involve more application in longer sessions (and 
possibly using different methods) than we earlier considered.
51
 * * *  
 However frightening the experience may be, OMS personnel have informed us that the 
waterboard technique is not physically painful. * * * As you have informed us, the CIA has 
previously used the waterboard repeatedly on two detainees, and, as far as can be determined, 
these detainees did not experience physical pain or, in the professional judgment of doctors, is 
there any medical reason to believe they would have done so. * * * We also conclude that the use 
of the waterboard, under the strict limits and conditions imposed, would not be expected to cause 
―severe physical suffering‖ under the statute. * * * To the extent that in some applications the use 
                                                          
51
 The IG report noted that in some cases the waterboard was used with far greater frequency than initially indicated, 
see IG Report at 5, 44, 46, 103-04, and also that it was used in a different manner. See id. at 37 (―[T]he waterboard 
technique… was different from the technique described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The 
difference was in the manner in which the detainee‘s breathing was obstructed. At the SERE school and is the DoJ 
opinion, the subject‘s airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passages; the 
interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency interrogator 
… applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee‘s mouth and nose. One of the 
psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency‘s use of the technique is different from that used in SERE 
training because it is ‗for real‘ and is more poignant and convincing.‖)  * * *  
of the waterboard could cause choking or similar physical—as opposed to mental—sensations, 
those physical sensations might well have an intensity approaching the degree contemplated by 
the statute. However, we understand that any such physical—as opposed to mental—sensations 
caused by the use of the waterboard end when the application ends. Given the limits imposed, 
and the fact that any physical distress (as opposed to possible mental suffering, which is 
discussed below) would occur only during the actual application of water, the physical distress 
caused by the waterboard would not be expected to have the duration required to amount to 
severe physical suffering. * * *  
 The most substantial question raised by the waterboard relates to the statutory definition 
of ―severe mental pain or suffering.‖ The sensation of drowning that we understand accompanies 
the use of the waterboard arguably could qualify as a ―threat of imminent death‖ within the 
meaning of section 2340(2)(C) and thus might constitute a predicate act for ―severe mental pain 
or suffering‖ under the statute.56 * * * Nevertheless, the statutory definition of ―severe mental 
pain or suffering‖ also requires that the predicate act produce ―prolonged mental harm.‖. As we 
understand from OMS personnel familiar with the history of the waterboard technique, as used 
both in SERE training (though in a substantially different manner) and in the previous CIA 
interrogations, there is no medical basis to believe that the technique would produce any mental 
effect beyond the distress that directly accompanies its use and the prospect that it will be used 
again. * * * But the physicians and psychologists at the CIA familiar with the facts have 
informed us that in the case of the two detainees who have been subjected to more extensive use 
of the waterboard technique, no evidence of prolonged mental harm has appeared in the period 
since the use of the waterboard on those detainees, a period which now spans at least 25 months 
for each of these detainees. * * * The technique may be designed to create fear at the time it is 
used on the detainee, so that the detainee will cooperate to avoid future sessions. Furthermore, 
we acknowledge that the term ―prolonged‖ is imprecise. Nonetheless, without in any way 
minimalizing the distress caused by this technique, we believe that the panic brought on by the 
waterboard during the very limited time it is actually administered, combined with any residual 
fear that maybe experienced over a somewhat longer period, could not be said to amount to the 
―prolonged mental harm‖ that the statute covers. * * *  
 Assuming adherence to the strict limitations discussed herein, including the careful 
medical monitoring and available intervention by the team as a necessary, we conclude that 
although the question is substantial and difficult, the authorized use of the waterboard by 
adequately trained interrogators and other team members could not reasonably be considered 
specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering and thus would not 
violate sections 2340-2340A.  
 In sum, based on the information you have provided and the limitations, procedures, and 
safeguards that would be in place, we conclude that—although extended sleep deprivation and 
use of the waterboard present more substantial questions in certain respects under the statute and 
the use of the waterboard raises the most substantial issue—none of these specified techniques, 
considered individually, would violate the prohibition in sections 2340-2340A. The universal 
rejection of torture and the President‘s unequivocal directive that the United States not engage in 
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 It is unclear whether a detainee being subjected to the waterboard in fact experiences it as a ―threat of imminent 
death.‖ We understand that the CIA may inform a detainee on whom this technique is used that he would not be 
allowed to drown. Moreover, after multiple applications of the waterboard, it may become apparent to the detainee 
that, however frightening the experience may be, it will not result in death.  
torture warrant great care in analyzing whether particular interrogation techniques are consistent 
with the requirements of sections 2340-2340A, and we have attempted to employ such care 
throughout our analysis. * * * As is apparent, our conclusion is based on the assumption that 
close observation, including medical and psychological monitoring of the detainees, will 
continue during the period when these techniques are used; that the personnel present are 
authorized to, and will, stop the use of a technique at any time if they believe it is being used 
improperly or threatens a detainee‘s safety or that a detainee may be at risk of suffering severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering that the medical and psychological personnel are continually 
assessing the available literature and ongoing experience with detainees, and that, as they have 
done to date, they will make adjustments to techniques to ensure that they do not cause severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering to the detainees, and that all interrogators and other team 
members understand the proper use of the techniques, that the techniques are not designed or 
intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering, and that they must cooperate with 
OMS personnel in the exercise of their important duties.  
 Please let us know if we may be of further assistance. 
  
NOTES & QUESTIONS 
 
1. Implementing The Memos. These memoranda provide highly detailed, almost 
choreographed, instructions on how to utilize particular techniques without running afoul of 
prohibition against torture.  How, as a practical matter, might such limitations have been arrived 
at? Are the opinions within the memoranda about whether particular techniques constitute torture 
within the competency of the lawyers providing the legal analysis? How are such instructions 
likely to be implemented in the context of a real-life interrogation? What would happen, for 
example, if a detainee refused to stand up and allow himself to be hung by his hands or wrists? 
What if a detainee continued to resist questioning after 180 hours of sleep deprivation?    
2. Mens Rea. Is the United States‘ ―understanding‖ of specific intent in the statute and in 
these memoranda consistent with your understanding of the concept as it applies to ordinary 
domestic law, the crime of torture under the Torture Convention, or the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY in Kunarac?  
3. Combined Techniques. The excerpted memo considers each technique in turn and 
explicitly does not consider their concurrent or consecutive use. In 2005, Bradbury authored 
another memorandum (―the Combined Use Memo‖) to Rizzo on the application of § 2340 to the 
―Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.‖  
Bradbury cautioned that ―[t]he issue of the combined effects of interrogation techniques raises 
complex and difficult questions and comes to us in a less precisely defined form than the 
questions treated in our earlier opinions about individual techniques.‖ Bradbury also noted that 
―it is possible that the application of certain techniques might render the detainee unusually 
susceptible to physical or mental pain or suffering,‖ such that careful monitoring is necessary to 
prevent the infliction of ―severe physical or mental pain or suffering.‖ Nonetheless, he concluded 
that ―the use of the techniques in combination as … described … would‖ not ―be expected to 
inflict ‗severe physical or mental pain or suffering‘ within the meaning of the statute,‖ although 
he cautioned that extended sleep deprivation and the waterboard may present ―more substantial 
risk of physical distress.‖ Under Bradbury‘s reasoning, so long as the interrogator did not 
specifically intend to cause severe pain or suffering, would it constitute torture if he or she did in 
fact do so with a combined set of techniques? The Combined Use Memo is available here: 
http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury_20pg.pdf. Research has 
demonstrated that ―The cumulative impact of torture stressors is also determined by the 
interactions among them. The distressing or helplessness-inducing
 
effect of a particular stressor 
might be compounded when combined
 
with another stressor. * * * Thus, the relative
 
impact of 
each stressor needs to be considered in the context
 
of its interactions with other concurrent 
stressors. A measure
 
of mere exposure to torture stressors fails to capture such
 
important 
information.‖ Başoğlu, supra, at 283.  
4. CIDT. Also in 2005, Bradbury prepared a memo (the ―CIDT Memo‖) addressed to the 
question of whether the particular techniques violated Article 16 of the Torture Convention, 
which states: 
 
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture 
as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
 
As a preliminary argument, the memorandum noted that Article 16 applies only to ―territory 
under [U.S.] jurisdiction,‖ which—in Bradbury‘s estimation—limits its applicability to areas 
―over which the U.S. exercises at least de facto authority as the government.‖ The CIA 
apparently had assured Bradbury that no interrogations took place in such areas; thus, the memo 
concluded that Article 16 was inapplicable to current detainees. Even if Article 16 were 
applicable, Bradbury noted that the U.S Senate‘s advice and consent to ratification to the Torture 
Convention was subject to a reservation that the U.S. was ―bound by the obligation under Article 
16 * * * only insofar as the term ‗cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‘ means 
the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.‖ Bradbury identified prior Supreme Court 
precedent, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) that dictated that even if the 
5
th
 Amendment to the Constitution applied to aliens abroad, the interrogation techniques would 
have to ―shock the conscience‖ by involving the arbitrary ―exercise of power without any 
reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government objective‖ to run afoul of the 
Constitution. (Only the 5
th
 Amendment governs pre-conviction federal conduct; the 8
th
 
amendment kicks in only upon conviction). He concluded that the techniques were not 
constitutionally arbitrary, because they ―are employed by the CIA only as reasonably deemed 
necessary to protect against grave threats to U.S. interests … pursuant to careful screening 
procedures;‖ they have been ―carefully designed to minimize the risk of suffering or injury and to 
avoid inflicting any serious or lasting physical or psychological harm;‖ and the CIA believes that 
the program has been ―largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 
States.‖ On this latter point, the memo detailed instances in which information obtained from 
―high value detainees‖ provided valuable insight into Al Qaeda‘s inner workings, was used to 
uncover further attacks or identify other Al Qaeda operatives, and led to more than 6,000 
intelligence reports. Bradbury noted that other situations in which similar governmental conduct 
might shock the conscience (such as within an ―ordinary criminal investigation‖) involve 
different governmental interests and implicate specific constitutional guarantees, such as the 
privilege against self-incrimination and due process trial protections. In this regard, Bradbury 
cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), a case in which the Supreme Court 
reversed a conviction in a case in which the prosecution had introduced evidence obtained by the 
forcible pumping of the defendant‘s stomach—conduct that the Court considered ―close to the 
rack and screw.‖ The memo also dismissed the relevance of U.S. military doctrine, which 
eschews such coercive techniques, to determine whether the conduct might ―shock the 
conscience‖ on the reasoning that such doctrine is designed for traditional armed conflicts 
governed by the Geneva Conventions. With respect to the relevance of the State Department‘s 
annual country reports, which condemn similar conduct, Bradbury noted that the reports do not 
provide sufficient detail of the types of techniques used, the contexts in which they are employed, 
or the governmental purposes that they seek to advance. The CIDT Memo is available here: 
http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf.  
5. Interrogation Theory. In the CIDT Memo, Bradbury also explicated a taxonomy of 
the various techniques.  First, there are ―conditioning techniques‖ (nudity, dietary manipulation, 
and sleep deprivation), which are used to ―demonstrate to the [detainee] that he has no control 
over basic human needs‖ so that he will ―value his personal welfare, comfort, and immediate 
needs more than the information he is protecting.‖ Second, there are ―corrective techniques‖ (the 
insult slap, abdominal slap, facial hold, and attention grasp) that ―condition a detainee to pay 
attention to the interrogator‘s questions and dislodge expectations that the detainee will not be 
touched.‖ Finally, there are ―coercive techniques‖ (walling, water dousing, stress positions, wall 
standing, cramped confinement, and the waterboard) that ―place the detainee in more physical 
and psychological stress.‖ In the Combined Use Memo, Bradbury described the prototypical 
phases of an interrogation:  
 
•  ―Initial Conditions‖: this involves a medical examination, sensory deprivation, 
transportation to the interrogation site, and being shaved and photographed, which 
confronts the detainee with a sudden change of environment to create uncertainty and 
dread as to what will happen next. 
•  ―Transition to Interrogation‖: this involves an initial interview in a relatively benign 
environment to ascertain the detainee‘s willingness to cooperate. This phase continues 
so long as the detainee is providing information on ―actionable threats‖ and the 
location of ―High-Value Targets.‖ If the detainee is not cooperative, then interrogators 
draft a detailed interrogation plan to the CIA for approval. 
•  ―Interrogation‖: at this point, the enhanced techniques are employed interchangeably, 
in succession, and simultaneously over a number of sessions for up to thirty days to 
frighten, wear down, and ultimately gain compliance from the detainee. As the 
detainee begins to cooperate, the interrogation techniques are decreased.  
 
 6. Waterboarding. As acknowledged by the memo excerpted above, one of the more 
controversial interrogation techniques used by the United States against suspected terrorists and 
other detainees is waterboarding. "Waterboarding" consists of using water to suffocate an 
individual, either by placing a wet towel or pouring water over a person's face to simulate a 
feeling of drowning. The declassified U.S. memoranda admitted that at least three individuals 
have been waterboarded by U.S. agents: Abu Zubaydah (a ―senior lieutenant‖ in al Qaeda 
captured in March 2002 who apparently wrote al Qaeda‘s manuals on resistance techniques and 
ran training camps) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (considered a primary architect of the 9/11 
attacks) were waterboarded 83 and 183 times, respectively, in some instances before the practice 
was officially sanctioned. The third is Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, alleged to be the mastermind of 
the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden in 2000 in which seventeen sailors 
were killed and thirty-nine others were injured. A footnote in the CIDT Memo indicates that the 
use of waterboarding may have been ―unnecessary‖ on Zubaydah as the on-scene interrogation 
team judged him to be compliant, but ―elements within CIA Headquarters still believed he was 
withholding information.‖ CIDT Memo, supra, at 31 n. 28. Reports are inconclusive as to 
whether actionable intelligence was revealed as a result of these techniques; some reports suggest 
that Zubaydah had revealed useful information prior to the harsh methods being used. Do you 
agree with the conclusion of the legal memoranda discussed above that waterboarding does not 
constitute torture or CIDT under the Torture Convention or U.S. law? If you think it does 
constitute torture, is it physical or mental torture? How would you characterize it under the 
Torture Convention and 18 U.S.C. § 2340?  
7. Waterboarding Through The Ages. According to Professor Alfred McCoy, the first 
reference to waterboarding appears in a 1541 French judicial handbook called "Torturae Gallicae 
Ordinariae." Alfred McCoy, The U.S. has a History of Using Torture, History News Network 
(Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://hnn.us/articles/32497.html. As the woodcut below indicates, 
waterboarding was a practice used in Europe at least as early as the 16th century: 
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Japan used waterboarding and other similar techniques against U.S. soldiers during World War 
II. At both the Tokyo war crimes trials as well as in subsequent war crimes trials conducted by 
the U.S., Japanese citizens were prosecuted and convicted of torture for such actions committed 
against U.S. and other Allied personnel. For example, Yukio Asano was sentenced by a U.S. 
court to fifteen years hard labor for the war crime of subjecting a U.S. citizen to a form of 
waterboarding. United States of America v. Hideji Nakamura, Yukio Asano, Seitara Hata, and 
Takeo Kita, U.S. Military Commission, Yokohama, May 1–28, 1947, NARA Records, NND 
735027 RG 153, Entry 143 Box 1025. Waterboarding was also practiced by the United States in 
Vietnam, as illustrated by this photograph from 1968 that was originally published in The 
Washington Post. Within one month of the appearance of the photograph, court martial 
proceedings were initiated against one of the soldiers. 
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For more on this case and the history of the prosecution of waterboarding by U.S. courts, see 
Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 
Columbia J. Trans'l L. 468 (2007). 
 8. Conditions of Confinement. Bradbury also wrote an August 31, 2006 letter to Rizzo 
evaluating conditions of confinement (specifically: the practice of blocking detainees‘ vision 
during transport around the facility, the use of incommunicado and solitary confinement, the 
playing of white noise in walkways to prevent communication, the constant illumination in cells, 
the use of shackling, and the policy of forcibly shaving detainees upon arrival) in CIA detention 
centers against the proscriptions in common Article 3. With respect to the prohibition against 
―outrages upon personal dignity,‖ he opined as follows:  
 [S]ubparagraph (c)‘s use of the phrase ―outrages upon personal dignity‖ should be 
understood to mean a relatively significant form of ill-treatment. In this context, 
―outrage‖ appears to carry the meaning of ―an act or condition that violated accepted 
standards.‖ * * * [A]n act must violate some relatively clear and objective standard of 
behavior or acceptable treatment; it must be something that does not merely insult the 
dignity of the victim, but does so in an obvious or particularly significant manner.  * * * 
Importantly, the text is clear that humiliating and degrading treatment‖ is merely a subset 
of ―outrages upon personal dignity.‖ This text stands in contrast to provisions in other 
treaties, such as Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture, in which prohibitions on 
―degrading‖ treatment stand alone. * * * The prohibition does not reach trivial slights or 
insults, but instead reaches only those that represent a more fundamental assault on the 
dignity of the victim. * * * Certain activities may well be intended solely to humiliate and 
to degrade in certain settings, but may be undertaken for a legitimate purpose in others. 
For example, a systematic practice of marching detainees blindfolded in public with the 
intent to humiliate may so evince a ―hostility to human dignity‖ as to run afoul of 
common Article 3. In contrast, obstructing the vision of the detainee during transport, 
with no needless exposure to the public, for the purpose [of] maintaining the security of 
the facility would not trigger the same concerns.   
 
Letter from Bradbury to Rizzo (Aug. 31, 2006). The same conditions were evaluated under the 
Detainee Treatment Act in a subsequent memorandum.  See Dept. of Justice, Memorandum for 
John H. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Application of the 
Detainee Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement at Central Intelligence Agency Detention 
Facilities (Aug. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/082409/olc/08312006%20Memorandum%20to%20Rizz
o.pdf. Compare this interpretation of what constitutes outrages upon personal dignity with the 
ICYT‘s interpretation of the crime in Kunarac.  
 9. Abu Zubaydah Interrogation. Prior to the issuance of the excerpted memorandum 
and contemporaneous memoranda discussed above, the Department of Justice was asked in 2002 
to evaluate the legality of the interrogation plan for Abu Zubaydah. This memorandum (the 
―Zubaydah Memo‖) was also authored by Judge Bybee. Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting 
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 
1, 2002), available at http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf. 
One of the proposed techniques was to place Zubaydah in a cramped confinement box with an 
insect. Zubaydah, whom the U.S. government had determined had a fear of insects, would have 
been told that the insect was a stinging insect, but the insect would actually be a harmless one, 
such as a caterpillar. In opining on the legality of the proposal, Bybee noted that this technique 
might implicate § 2340‘s prohibition against ―the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of 
severe physical pain or suffering‖ or ―the threat of imminent death.‖ Accordingly, he advised:  
 
If you [tell him it is a stinging insect], to ensure that you are outside the predicate act 
requirement, you must inform him that the insects will not have a sting that would 
produce death or severe pain. If, however, you were to place the insect in the box without 
informing him that you are doing so, then, in order not to commit a predicate act, you 
should not affirmatively lead him to believe that any insect is present which has a sting 
that could produce severe pain or suffering or even cause his death. asdkhaiofni [S]o long 
as you take either of the approaches we have described, the insect's placement in the box 
would not constitute a threat of severe physical pain or suffering to a reasonable person in 
his position. An individual placed in a box, even an individual with a fear of insects, 
would not reasonably feel threatened with severe physical pain or suffering if a caterpillar 
was placed in the box. 
 
With respect to the waterboard, the memo concluded that ―the use of the waterboard constitutes a 
threat of imminent death.‖ The memo noted that in order to be actionable under §2340, any such 
technique must cause ―prolonged mental harm‖ and that the CIA did not ―anticipate that any 
prolonged mental harm would result from the use of the waterboard,‖ because ―relief is almost 
immediate when the cloth is removed from the nose and mouth.‖ The Obama administration 
withdrew four of the memos discussed above (the Zubaydah, §2340, Combined Use, and Article 
16). See David Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Withdrawal of Office of Legal 
Counsel CIA Interrogation Opinions (April 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/2009/withdrawalofficelegalcounsel.pdf. The Conditions of 
Confinement Memo appears to still be in place.  
10. Uniform Code of Military Justice. U.S. military personnel are subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which contains a number of potentially applicable punitive 
articles, although no provision on torture per se. Relevant charges include: Article 93 (cruelty 
and maltreatment), Article 118 (murder), Article 119 (manslaughter), Article 120 (rape and 
carnal knowledge), Article 124 (maiming), Article 125 (sodomy), Article 128 (assault), and 
Article 133 (conduct unbecoming an officer). The Code recognizes the inchoate offenses of 
attempt (Article 80), conspiracy (Article 81), accessory after the fact (Article 78), and solicitation 
(Article 82). The assault formulation is particularly elastic; a simple assault can be consummated 
by ―an unlawful demonstration of violence … which creates in the mind of another a reasonable 
apprehension of receiving immediate bodily harm.‖ The specific intent to actually inflict bodily 
harm is not required under this provision. To the extent that there is no particular UCMJ 
provision directly on point, members of the armed forces can also be prosecuted for non-capital 
violations of Title 18 (including torture and war crimes) pursuant to Article 134, which allows 
for federal crimes to be charged by courts martial.  A memorandum drafted by Staff Judge 
Advocate Diane Beaver acknowledged that many interrogation techniques would potentially fall 
afoul of these provisions (indeed, she reasoned that any physical contact with detainees might 
constitute an assault). Nonetheless, she concluded in her memo that the methods ―do not violate 
applicable federal law,‖ although she suggests that military members using these tactics be 
granted ―permission or immunity in advance.‖  Dept. of Defense, Counter-Resistance Strategies 
(Oct. 11, 2002), available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/dunlavey101102mem.pdf. The Beaver 
memo was a response to a request by interrogators to escalate the techniques used on Mohammed 
Al-Kahtani (or Qahtani), the putative 20
th
 hijacker, who had not yet been broken.  
 11. The Committee Against Torture and the United States. Parties to the Torture 
Convention must periodically submit reports to the Committee Against Torture, a body of 
experts charged with enforcing the treaty.  The Committee considered the United States‘ second 
periodic report in 2006. Acknowledging the allegations of torture against detainees, the United 
States‘ report emphasized that the Bush Administration prohibits torture and prosecutes 
substantiated allegations. The report included an Annex of relevant proceedings. In response, the 
Committee in its concluding observations welcomed the United States‘ comprehensive 
submission, but raised the following concerns and recommendations, among others:  
 
•  The U.S. should enact a domestic torture statute rather than rely on ordinary crimes of 
murder and assault to prosecute domestic torture.  
•  U.S. law should reflect the fact that acts of psychological manipulation need not cause 
―prolonged mental harm‖ to constitute torture. 
•  The U.S. should ensure that the Convention applies at all times, even in armed 
conflict, in any area under the party‘s jurisdiction, defined as areas under the state‘s de 
facto effective control. 
•  The U.S. should register all persons it detains anywhere in the world as a safeguard 
against acts of torture and ensure that no one is detained in any secret detention 
facility. No secret detention facilities should be utilized.  
•  The U.S. should apply the non-refoulement guarantee to all detainees in its custody, 
even those detained outside U.S. territory, and refrain from relying on ―diplomatic 
assurances‖ when it sends detainees to states that systematically violate the 
Convention. 
•  The U.S. should close the Guantánamo detention facility and charge or return 
individuals to a place where they do not face a risk of torture. 
•  Interrogation techniques such as water-boarding or the use of dogs should be ceased. 
•  Victims of torture should have the opportunity to obtain redress.  
•  All allegations of torture or CIDT should be investigated.  
 
U.N. Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under 
Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against 
Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/cats36.htm. 
 12. Extraterritorial Application. A recurring issue in human rights law concerns the 
question of the degree to which treaty obligations of states apply in extraterritorial contexts. The 
Committee Against Torture in a ―General Comment‖ on the Torture Convention emphasized that 
the Convention applies to ―any territory under [a state‘s] jurisdiction,‖ which protects any person 
―subject to the de jure or de facto control of a State party,‖ including when persons are in the 
hands of individuals acting at the behest of a State party. See Committee Against Torture, 
General Comment No. 2: Implementation of article 2 by States parties, U.N. Doc., No. 
CAT/C/GC/2, para. 7 (Jan. 24, 2008), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/402/62/PDF/G0840262.pdf?OpenElement.    
13. SERE Training. Under the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) program, 
U.S. military personnel have voluntarily participated in survival training that includes the use of 
tactics to resist physical and psychological interrogations if captured. The goal of the program is 
to prepare soldiers for the types of abuse they might suffer if captured by hostile forces. The U.S. 
Air Force established the program at the end of the Korean War based upon the experiences of 
U.S. and allied prisoners of war. It was expanded after the Vietnam War to cover other branches 
of the military. In an article on the program, The New Yorker magazine reported that 
psychologists who helped develop and implement the SERE program had been advising 
detention and interrogation personnel at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere on how the results of 
SERE might be ―re-engineered‖ for the purpose of developing effective interrogation and 
counter-resistance programs, especially against individuals who may have received resistance 
training themselves. In addition, Behavioral Science Consultation Teams (―biscuits‖ in military 
jargon) from the military intelligence units were apparently also employed to develop 
interrogation strategies, some individually tailored to particular detainees. See Jane Mayer, The 
Experiment, The New Yorker (July 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/11/050711fa_fact4. For what purpose is the SERE 
program invoked in the excerpted memorandum? How relevant to the question of the legality of 
the techniques discussed is the fact that members of the U.S. armed forces were subjected to 
waterboarding and other authorized interrogation techniques in connection with the SERE 
program?  
14. Doctors and Psychologists. The memo above references the CIA‘s Office of Medical 
Services (OMS), a division of the Agency tasked in part to ensure the physical and mental 
wellbeing of CIA employees and their families as well as to produce psychiatric and medical 
intelligence. Other memoranda, a report from the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), and the testimony of detainees reveals that medical personnel, particularly psychologists, 
were aware of, designed, supervised, and were in some cases involved in, the abuse of detainees.  
In some cases, it appears medical personnel collected aggregate data on detainees‘ reactions to 
particular techniques, suggesting some level of medical experimentation. The World Medical 
Association, a membership organization representing physicians around the world including 
those in the United States, issued in 1975 the Declaration of Tokyo—Guidelines for Physicians 
Concerning Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment in Relation 
to Detention and Imprisonment (available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/c18.htm). The 
Declaration prohibits medical personnel from participating in any way in torture or other forms 
of abuse, even as monitors. In particular, the Declaration states that a physician ―shall not use nor 
allow to be used, as far as he or she can, medical knowledge or skills, or health information 
specific to individuals, to facilitate or otherwise aid any interrogation, legal or illegal, of those 
individuals.‖ Both the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Association 
have ethics statements prohibiting the involvement of healthcare personnel in interrogations and 
torture. In 2006, the Pentagon released new guidelines (―Medical Program Support for Detainee 
Operations,‖ Instruction No. 2310.08E) prohibiting doctors charged with the medical care of 
detainees from participating in interrogations, but allowing the participation of non-treating 
health care personnel (i.e., individuals not involved in giving care) such as behavioral science 
consultants. This position is shared by the American Psychological Association, many of whose 
members view psychology as not only a mental health profession, but also a science of human 
behavior. For more on evolving policies around the use of psychologists in detention and 
interrogation, see Carroll H. Greene III & L. Morgan Banks, Ethical Guideline Evolution In 
Psychological Support To Interrogation Operations, 61 Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice 
and Research 25–32 (2009). For a discussion of doctors and torture, see Elena Nightingale, The 
Breaking of Bodies and Minds (1985); Steven Miles, Oath Betrayed: Torture, Medical 
Complicity, and the War on Terror (2006). In addition to potential violations of ethical 
guidelines, may criminal sanctions attach where doctors or others from the healing professions 
participate in abusive interrogations? 
15. Advice-of-Counsel & Reliance Defenses. Given the existence of the ―Torture 
Memos,‖ might a CIA agent subject to prosecution raise either the defense of advice of counsel 
or reasonable reliance on official interpretation? The advice-of-counsel doctrine works to 
establish a defendant‘s good faith and can negate the scienter requirement of a particular crime or 
cause of action (i.e., the intent to engage in, or the knowledge of, wrongdoing). The advice-of-
counsel doctrine is generally employed with respect to offenses defined by an intent to defraud, 
willfulness, or bad faith. The defendant who relies upon the advice of counsel may thus be able 
to prove that he had a good faith belief that his actions were legal prior to his actions. Because 
the doctrine does not require that the defendant admit any aspect of the accuser‘s case, the 
doctrine is not technically an affirmative defense that results in exoneration notwithstanding that 
all elements of the claim or crime have been established. Likewise, the reliance defense applies 
more often in situations involving regulatory crimes rather than intrinsically wrong (malum in se) 
acts. The U.S. Model Penal Code at §2.04 treats these defenses under the heading ―Ignorance or 
Mistake:‖  
  
(1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if: 
(a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or 
negligence required to establish a material element of the offense * * *  
 
(3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a 
prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when: … 
 
(b) [the defendant] acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, 
afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in  
(i)    a statute or other enactment;  
(ii)   a judicial decision, opinion or judgment;  
(iii)  an administrative order or grant of permission; or  
(iv)  an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with 
responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law 
defining the offense. 
 
Both defenses rely on basic moral principles of, and utilitarian rationales for, criminal 
responsibility and punishment that consider it odious or useless to punish someone who 
manifested a clear intent not to break the law formed in reliance on legal or official advice. If you 
represented a hypothetical CIA interrogator who employed enhanced interrogation techniques, 
how would you argue that these defenses were applicable? Are scienter or willfulness elements 
of torture as it is defined in the Torture Convention or the Torture Memos? Is the degree of pain 
caused by a particular technique something on which a lawyer can provide an expert opinion? 
Would it be reasonable to rely upon one of the torture memos in determining whether particular 
interrogation techniques were lawful? 
 16. Torture Warrants. Alan Dershowitz, a law professor at Harvard Law School, 
became one of the most public proponents of establishing a system that, in some circumstances, 
would allow torture notwithstanding the United States‘ treaty obligations. In these debates, 
Dershowitz admitted that he opposed torture "as a normative matter," but he accepted that it was 
being widely used by U.S. officials and agents. Rather than argue for increased enforcement of 
the prohibition against torture, Dershowitz argued that the practice should be made public, and 
thus subject to more transparent forms of accountability by requiring that an official secure a 
judicial warrant authorizing torture. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: 
Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (2002). For a thoughtful collection of 
essays on the morality, legality, and history of torture, including an essay by Dershowitz and a 
critical response by Elaine Scarry, see Sanford Levinson, ed., Torture: A Collection (2004). 
17. Extraordinary Rendition. The United States and other states have engaged in a 
secret program known as "extraordinary rendition," whereby an individual suspected of terrorism 
is transferred from one state to another for purposes of interrogation, detention, and possible 
prosecution. Critics of the program contend that its purpose is to transfer suspects to places 
where torture is regularly practiced, and thus is—in effect—a program for ―outsourcing torture.‖ 
For one of the early stories revealing the U.S. extraordinary rendition program, see Jane Mayer, 
Annals of Justice: Outsourcing Torture, The New Yorker (Feb. 14, 2005); see also Meg 
Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 George 
Wash. L. Rev. 1333 (2007). One of the stories highlighted in the Mayer article is that of Maher 
Arar, a Canadian citizen who, while traveling through the U.S. on his way home to Canada, was 
detained by U.S. immigration officials and questioned about possible links to terrorism for 
thirteen days. Arar was born in Syria, but moved to Canada with his family when he was 17. 
After his interrogation, he was flown by plain-clothed officials to Syria, where he was beaten and 
tortured for one year. A year later, the Syrian government released him, claiming they were 
unable to find any connection of Arar to terrorism. The Canadian government established a 
commission of inquiry into its own complicity in Arar's detention and rendition to Syria. The 
commission concluded that there was no credible evidence linking Arar to any form of terrorism, 
and that while Canadian officials provided information to the U.S. government concerning Arar, 
they were unable to conclude that the Canadian government participated in or supported Arar's 
detention by U.S. officials and subsequent rendition to Syria. The full report of the Canadian 
commission of inquiry can be found here, http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf. 
For a discussion of the United States‘ non-refoulement obligations, see Congressional Research 
Service, The U.N. Convention Against Torture: Overview of U.S. Implementation Policy 
Concerning the Removal of Aliens (Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32276.pdf. The European Court of Human Rights has 
affirmed that individuals cannot be returned to a place where they may be tortured, even if the 
receiving government has given assurances that the person will not be mistreated. Chahal v. 
United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, para. 105, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/.  
18. ―Does Torture Work”? Many consequentialist arguments about torture (which are 
premised on the belief that torture is justified in extreme situations in order to save the lives of 
others) hinge on the assumption that torture ―works‖ to force subjects to divulge true and 
actionable information. Indeed, according to the ―one percent doctrine‖ attributed to former Vice 
President Dick Cheney, so long as there is a one percent chance that torture will produce useful 
intelligence, torture should be employed.  ―Proof‖ however is often lacking or deemed to be a 
state secret, unable to be divulged. On the other hand, anti-torture absolutists insist—with equally 
little empirical data for support—that torture does not work and is counter-productive. Given the 
absolute prohibition against torture under international law, is any debate about its efficacy valid? 
How would one judge the veracity of statements made by subjects under torture? Even if some 
useful information was revealed, how would one judge whether the use of torture was ―worth‖ 
the costs associated with such a practice? For a discussion that torture has not worked in any 
historical context in which it has been systematically employed, see Lisa Hajjar, Does Torture 
Work? A Sociological Assessment of the Practice in Historical and Global Perspective, 5 Ann. 
Rev. of Law and Soc. Science 11.1 (2009). 
 
PROBLEMS 
 
1.  Ticking Bomb. Consider the following scenario. The police have information 
suggesting that a bomb has been planted in a crowded civilian location and will be detonated 
soon. They have arrested an individual whom they believe was involved in the planting of the 
bomb, knows its location, and knows the means by which it will be detonated. Two interrogators 
repeatedly tortured the individual in order to determine the location of the bomb. Later, the two 
interrogators are prosecuted for torture under a statute similar in formulation to §2340. Under 
what circumstances should they be convicted? What test would you devise to allow the defense 
of necessity in such a situation? Does it matter if, as a result of the torture, the individual 
discloses the location of the bomb and it is defused? What if the suspect discloses the location, 
but there is not enough time to stop its detonation? What if the individual does not disclose the 
location of the bomb, and the bomb is detonated? What if it turns out there was no bomb? Is the 
ticking time bomb scenario a useful one to utilize to discuss whether or not torture or harsh 
interrogation techniques should be legal or authorized? Is it useful to considering whether a 
defense of necessity should be recognized for interrogations in the context of threats to national 
security? Is an individual likely to divulge the location of a hidden bomb if it is likely to be 
detonated in the immediate future, which presumably would end the torture? How does the 
scenario impact rhetorically the way in which the legality and efficacy of torture is debated? 
2. Forcefeeding. Starting in 2002, detainees on Guantánamo began staging non-violent 
hunger strikes to protest their detention and conditions of confinement. The strikes have 
occurred, off and on, since then, occasionally involving up to 200 men participating in shifts. At 
least 30 men detained on Guantánamo have been force-fed in response to these hunger-strikes. 
Force-feeding involves strapping the detainee in a six-point restraint chair (marketed by the 
vender as ―a padded cell on wheels‖) or on a bed with Velcro straps (at times after a forcible 
extraction from their cells). A tube, alleged to be as thick as a finger, is inserted into the nostril of 
the detainee, and upwards of 1.5 liters of liquid food, such as Ensure Plus, is administered by 
either medics or, it is alleged, untrained guards or riot squad personnel. The individuals remain 
strapped down for up to an hour after the feeding in order to prevent them from regurgitating the 
foodstuff. Reports from Guantánamo indicated that guards would at times leave the feeding tube 
in place between feedings in order to avoid having to re-insert them each time. It has also been 
alleged that the tubes are not sterilized between detainees and that the liquid food was laced with 
laxatives.  
Force-feeding can cause complications such as infections, dizziness, ―dumping 
syndrome‖ (an expulsion reaction caused by over-feeding), inflammation, internal bleeding, 
bloating, vomiting blood, and gastrointestinal disorders (such as nausea and diarrhea). 
Muhammad Ahmad Abdallah Salih (31), who may have been tubefed more than any other 
detainee, apparently committed suicide during a hunger strike in which he was forcefed, although 
how he accomplished this has not been revealed. Another detainee, Farhan Abdul Latif, 
attempted to cover himself with his own excrement in order to avoid being force fed, but the tube 
was allegedly inserted through the excrement covering his nostrils. One detainee explained his 
resort to a hunger strike as follows: 
 
This hunger strike is the only way I have to speak out. I do not strike because I enjoy 
hunger, thirst, fever, fatigue, pain, lightheadedness, or my body consuming itself. I do it 
to protest the injustice all the prisoners endure—the attacks on my religion, the disrespect 
shown to the Qur‗an, the denial of medical treatment, the torture, and the cruelty of the 
interrogators. My strike is a form of peaceful protest against this injustice. 
 
This quote and the above accounts are drawn from a formal communication filed by several 
human rights groups against U.S. Army General Bantz John Craddock, then U.S. Southern 
Command Commander in charge of Guantánamo and former NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR).  The communication was filed with the United Nations Special 
Rapporteurs on Torture, Health, and the Promotion of Human Rights while Countering 
Terrorism. See Center for Constitutional Rights et al., Formal Communication for Consideration 
and Action (April 2, 2009), available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Formal%20Communication%20Craddock%20April%202,%202009.pdf 
 Does the practice of forcefeeding hunger strikers constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment under U.S. or international law? Is it a violation of common Article 3, which 
requires detaining authorities to treat prisoners humanely and to refrain from acts of cruel 
treatment and from degrading or humiliating treatment? Are there parallels between force-
feeding and the dietary manipulation authorized by the excerpted memorandum? Is it relevant 
that standing guidelines used by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons and the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement‘s Office of Detention and Removal allow prison/ICE officials to force prisoners to 
eat when the individual‘s life or health is at risk? See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 549.65 (Refusal to Accept 
Treatment). By way of comparison, the World Medical Association‘s Guidelines for Physicians 
Concerning Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment in Relation 
to Detention and Imprisonment (―Declaration of Tokyo‖) states:  
 
Where a prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as capable of 
forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the consequences of such a 
voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed artificially. The decision as to 
the capacity of the prisoner to form such a judgment should be confirmed by at least one 
other independent physician. The consequences of the refusal of nourishment shall be 
explained by the physician to the prisoner. 
 
Should U.S. detention officers allow hunger strikers to die as the British did with Irish 
Republican Army captives in the 1980s?  
3. Prosecute or Praise? Imagine a multi-ethnic country in Southeast Asia where the 
sense of peace and security is increasingly shattered by a separatist movement in the north of the 
country, predominantly populated by an ethnic minority.  Historically, members of the movement 
employed the political process, a savvy media campaign, and non-violent direct action tactics to 
achieve change. In recent years, however, a wing of the movement has grown increasingly 
frustrated with the slow pace of change and has begun resorting to terrorist methods to bring 
attention to its cause. These methods have primarily involved delivering, on a weekly basis, 
incendiary devices disguised as harmless letters and packages to prominent members of the 
ethnic majority group.  At the beginning of each week, the entire country is on edge awaiting the 
next attack.  
 Following up on a tip, the country‘s criminal investigative agency apprehended an 
individual who turned out to be a relatively senior operative of the movement. In her possession 
was a laptop with a number of coded files that seemed to detail past and potentially future 
attacks. After thoroughly searching the remote safe house where she and a confederate were 
captured, the investigative agents staged a firefight that destroyed the building. The central 
government then announced that the operative had been killed in the firefight and that no 
important leads had been discovered.  
 Meanwhile, the operative‘s captors began secretly interrogating her in an effort to fully 
break the code and identify the victims and modalities of future attacks. After she refused to 
cooperate, the agents escalated the harshness of tactics used on her. In addition to being kept for 
long periods of time in various stress positions, the operative was deprived of sleep, kept in an 
excessively cold and then hot cell, interrogated and photographed naked by male interrogators, 
and denied immediate medical attention for wounds received upon capture (although she was 
eventually treated). She was repeatedly subjected to strip and bodily cavity searches, ostensibly 
because she might have come into possession of prohibited items. The confederate captured with 
her was subjected to similar conduct. Individuals in lab coats observed these sessions, 
occasionally recording the captives‘ vital signs.  
 After the rebels staged an attack on the country‘s Constitutional Court, the Prime Minister 
convened a secret meeting of senior national security, intelligence, and foreign ministry cabinet 
members and a few key deputies to address the growing terrorism threat in the country. In an 
effort to more effectively halt and prevent the attacks, the Prime Minister asked the team to 
design a program to capture and interrogate members of the separatist group who were prone to 
violence.  He insisted that the program be consistent with the country‘s international law 
obligations and domestic law, which includes a statute penalizing torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment that copies verbatim the formulation of those offenses contained within the 
Torture Convention. The group—dubbed the Senior National Security Advisors (SNSA)—
eventually approved a classified interrogation program for captured terrorists that authorized the 
techniques already used on the senior operative and her confederate in addition to other enhanced 
tactics, such as prolonged solitary confinement, the manipulation of ethnic loyalties or cultural 
beliefs, the exploitation of phobias, and mock executions.  In support of the program, several law 
professors who had short term appointments with the Ministry of Justice presented research on 
the legality of the proposed tactics.  In addition, several physicians and psychologists were 
contracted from the private sector to provide advice on the design and implementation of the 
program. Members of the Ministry of Defense reportedly raised strong objections to some of the 
more harsh tactics, but the group ultimately unanimously signed off on the program. The Prime 
Minister did not attend the meetings, but he was briefed on their contours and results in a series 
of classified memoranda. Senior interrogators were instructed on elements of the program in 
confidential training sessions.  
 After an extensive interrogation by intelligence officials that followed 180 hours of sleep 
deprivation, the confederate eventually revealed the key to break the code on the seized laptop.  
Two subsequent attacks were successfully thwarted, and additional members of the separatist 
movement were captured and detained.  They too were interrogated by intelligence agents in 
accordance with the program devised by the Senior National Security Advisors. In most cases, 
interrogators followed the instructions they had received in their training. On several occasions, 
however, when it was suspected that a subject was not being cooperative, interrogators exceeded 
the limits imposed on them by the program with respect to certain tactics.  
 The next national election resulted in the ouster of several members of parliament, 
including the Prime Minister. The reconfigured parliament passed new legislation that amended 
the torture/CIDT statute to prohibit a number of enumerated interrogation tactics, including sleep 
deprivation for more than 48 hours, mock executions, and the use of any nudity, dogs, or 
prolonged stress positions (exceeding 5 hours) in interrogations.  Nothing in the legislative 
record reveals whether the legislation is to be applied retroactively.  
 You are a recently appointed senior official in the Ministry of Justice tasked with 
determining whether to bring charges against anyone involved in the design and implementation 
of the SNSA interrogation policy. How would you approach your mandate? Who—if anyone—
would you target for investigation and possible prosecution? Would you prosecute individuals 
who stayed within the ―four corners‖ of the original program or only those who exceeded the 
limits placed on them in training?  Assuming you decide to go forward with prosecutions, what 
theories of liability would you employ to reach the different participants in the program? 
